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Abstract
Human societies include many types of social relationships. Friends, family, business col-
leagues, online contacts, and religious groups, for example, can all contribute to an individ-
ual’s social life. Individuals may behave differently in different domains, but their success in
one domain may nonetheless engender success in another. The complexity caused by distinct,
but coupled, arenas of social interaction may be a key driver of prosocial or selfish behavior in
societies. Here, we study this problem using multilayer networks to model a population with
multiple domains of social interactions. An individual can appear in multiple different lay-
ers, each with separate behaviors and environments. We provide mathematical results on the
resulting behavioral dynamics, for any multilayer structure. Across a diverse space of struc-
tures, we find that coupling between layers tends to promote prosocial behavior. In fact, even
if prosociality is disfavored in each layer alone, multilayer coupling can promote its prolifera-
tion in all layers simultaneously. We apply these techniques to six real-world multilayer social
networks, ranging from the networks of socio-emotional and professional relationships in a
Zambian community, to the networks of online and offline relationships within an academic
University. Our results suggest that coupling between distinct domains of social interaction is
critical for the spread of prosociality in human societies.
1 Introduction
The scale and sophistication of global human societies are due in no small part to cooperation.
Altruistic behavior that benefits the collective, and entails personal costs to the individual, has
long been recognized as an important aspect of both human and non-human societies [1]. Just
as prosocial behaviors have unquestionably shaped the past, they will also play a major role in
shaping the present and future. From the collective action necessary to prevent the spread of
COVID-19 in the short term [2, 3], to efforts to combat climate change for future generations
[4, 5], cooperation is a critical precursor to social prosperity.
At the same time, the emergence and stability of prosocial behaviors is perplexing in light
of Darwin’s notion of “survival of the fittest” [6, 7]. Several mechanisms have been proposed to
*Corresponding authors: Qi Su (qisu1991@sas.upenn.edu) and Alex McAvoy (amcavoy@sas.upenn.edu).
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explain their widespread abundance [8], most notably spatial structure, which constrains inter-
action and dispersal patterns within a population [9–17]. The effects of population structure on
cooperation have been studied theoretically, using computer simulations [18], by approximation
techniques [19], and by direct analysis of special cases [20, 21]; and they have been observed
empirically in laboratory experiments [22]. The latest mathematical results allow for exhaustive
analysis of large families of heterogeneous population structures [23–25] and arbitrary initial
configurations of individuals [26]. A large portion of population structures favor antisocial traits,
such as spite [27], which is simultaneously intriguing and concerning.
Nonetheless, a single network cannot capture the complexity of social structures in human
societies. Individuals typically form many different types of social relationships. They enjoy
leisure time with friends and encounter colleagues in the workplace. They have physical contact
with those who are nearby and participate in online social networks to keep in touch with friends
who are more distant [28–32]. Each type of relationship forms a domain in which interactions
take place, and individuals may behave differently in different domains. Success in one domain,
such as wealth accumulated in business settings, may nonetheless have an impact on success in
other domains, such as influence and trustworthiness of opinions expressed on social media. The
tendency of an individual’s behavior to spread is therefore often dependent on their aggregate
success across the domains in which they interact – which introduces a form of coupling between
different social domains.
Prior studies of prosocial behavior using evolutionary game theory have either focused on a
single domain or assumed that all domains are undifferentiated—all domains are governed by
the same game and individuals use the same strategy against all opponents [9–21, 23–27]. In
practice, however, altruistic acts involve different costs and benefits in different domains, such
as donating a dollar to someone in person versus sharing a useful tip on social media. As a
result, an individual is likely to exhibit different behaviors in distinct domains. Compared with a
growing literature on the dynamics and structural analysis of multiple-domain coupling [33, 34],
the evolution of prosocial behavior has received much less attention [35, 36]. Mathematical results
on this topic also remain absent, even for the simplest cases.
In this study, we use a multilayer network to describe a population with multiple domains
of strategic interactions. Each layer describes the network of interactions that occur in given
domain, and the players can adopt different behavioral strategies in different domains. An indi-
vidual’s behavior in a given domain is preferentially copied by others in that domain, based on
the individual’s aggregate success across domains. We provide mathematical results applicable
to any multilayer structure (i.e. the number of layers and connections within each layer), any
initial strategy configuration, and any strategy update rule in each layer. A thorough analysis of
all two-layer networks with small size, a sample of large two-layer random networks, and six em-
pirical multilayer social networks, demonstrates that coupling layers tends to strongly promote
cooperation. If cooperation is disfavored in each layer alone, or even if layers individually favor
spite, coupling layers can often promote cooperation in all layers. The multiple domains that
structure human societies thus serve as a natural breeding ground for cooperation to flourish.
2 Model
We model a population of individuals engaged in pairwise social interactions in multiple do-
mains, or layers. Each individual uses separate strategies and plays distinct games in each layer.
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Figure 1: Evolutionary games in multilayer populations. A population with two domains of social interaction is
described by a two-layer network, with edge weights w[1]ij in layer one and w
[2]
ij in layer two (see numbers next to
edges for this example). Each player occupies a node in layer one and an associated node in layer two, as indicated by
dashed lines. Each player adopts a (possibly different) strategy in each layer, such as cooperation (blue) or defection
(red). In each successive time step, each player i plays game one with all her neighbors in layer one and derives an
average payoff u[1]i in layer one; the player also plays game two with all her neighbors in layer two and obtains average
payoff u[2]i . Player i’s total payoff is the sum across layers, ui = u
[1]
i + u
[2]
i , which determines her reproductive rate,
fi = exp (δui). After all social interactions occur, a random player i is selected to update her strategy in layer one by
copying that of a random neighbor j with probability proportional to j’s total fitness w[1]ij f j (i.e. preferential copying of
successful individuals). At the same time, a (possibly different) player k updates his strategy in layer two, by copying
that of a random neighbor h proportional to w[2]kh fh. We focus our analysis on donation games, in which each player
chooses whether to pay a cost (c) to provide a benefit to her neighbor. The benefit may be different in layer one (b1)
than in layer two (b2).
An individual’s accumulated payoff over all layers governs how much influence she has on her
peers’ strategy updates in each layer.
In our model, nodes represent individuals and edges describe their social interactions. The
population structure is described by a two-layer network, so that each individual corresponds to
a node in layer one and an associated node in layer two (see Supporting Information for analysis
of more than two layers). Interactions within layer one occur along weighted edges w[1]ij ; and
interactions in layer two occur along weighted edges w[2]ij . The degree of node i in layer one is
w[1]i = ∑
N
j=1 w
[1]
ij , whereas it is w
[2]
i = ∑
N
j=1 w
[2]
ij in layer two.
Players engage in a donation game in every domain. In each layer, a player must choose
either to cooperate (C) or defect (D) with her neighbors in that layer. A cooperative act means
paying a cost of c to provide the opponent with a benefit. The size of the benefit may differ across
layers: b1 in layer one and b2 in layer two. Defection incurs no cost and provides no benefit to
the opponent. A player’s strategy may differ across layers, and so we let s[1]i ∈ {0, 1} denote
player i’s strategy in layer one and s[2]i ∈ {0, 1} in layer two, where 1 denotes cooperation and 0
defection. This multilayer donation game is depicted in Fig. 1.
In each successive time step, each individual plays game one with all her neighbors in layer
one, and she plays game two with all her neighbors in layer two. Each player i obtains edge-
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weighted average payoff u[1]i in layer one and u
[2]
i in layer two, given by
u[1]i = −cs[1]i + b1
N
∑
j=1
p[1]ij s
[1]
j ,
u[2]i = −cs[2]i + b2
N
∑
j=1
p[2]ij s
[2]
j ,
(1)
where p[1]ij = w
[1]
ij /w
[1]
i and p
[2]
ij = w
[2]
ij /w
[2]
i . Player i’s total payoff is the sum of those obtained
in each layer, namely ui = u
[1]
i + u
[2]
i . The total payoff across layers determines the rate at which
a player’s strategy spreads (i.e. its “reproductive rate”), fi = exp (δui), where 0 < δ < 1 is the
intensity of selection [37]. The regimes δ  1 corresponds to weak selection [38, 39] and δ = 0
corresponds to neutral drift.
At the end of one time step, a random player i is selected to update her strategy in layer one.
With probability proportional to w[1]ij f j, player i’s strategy in layer one is replaced by player j’s
strategy in layer one. This update rule ensures that a player preferentially copies the strategy of
successful individuals. At the same time, a random player k is selected to update his strategy
in layer two. With probability proportional to w[2]kh fh, player k’s strategy in layer two is replaced
by h’s strategy in layer two. We focus on this form of “death-birth” updating [19], and we also
analyze other mechanisms such as pairwise-comparison updating, birth-death updating, and a
mixture of the two (i.e. different update rules for different layers; see Supporting Information).
Results
In the absence of innovation (mutation), the population eventually settles into an absorbing state
in which all players either cooperate or defect, in each layer. The absorbing state in the two layers
may be different, e.g. cooperation in layer one and defection in layer two. In general, selection
can favor cooperation provided the benefit-to-cost ratio b/c is sufficiently large [19]. Here, we
analyze how the critical benefit-to-cost ratio to support cooperation in layer one, (b1/c)
∗, depends
on coupling with a second layer.
Let ρ[1]C denote the probability that all players eventually cooperate in layer one, starting from
some fixed configuration of cooperators and defectors. We use
(
ρ
[1]
C
)◦
to denote this probability
under neutral drift, i.e. when δ = 0. Selection is said to favor the emergence and fixation of coop-
eration (or cooperation replacing defection) in layer one when the inequality ρ[1]C >
(
ρ
[1]
C
)◦
holds
[10, 19, 37]. We focus primarily on the probability that cooperation will fix under weak selection,
compared to neutral drift. In Supporting Information, we also compare the fixation probability
of cooperation to the fixation probability of defection, and we find qualitatively similar results
using this relative measure.
2.1 General rule for the evolution of cooperation in multilayer populations
To analyze the evolution of cooperation in multilayer networks, we adapt techniques from the
study of strategy assortment in single-layer networks [23, 25, 26], based on random walks within
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the network. It is necessary to first understand what a random walk in a multilayer network
looks like. In a two-layer network, we define a random walk as follows: a step from node i to j in
layer one (respectively layer two) occurs with probability p[1]ij (p
[2]
ij ). An (n, m)-step random walk
in the network means an n-step random walk in layer one followed by an m-step random walk
in layer two, where the beginning of the second random walk corresponds to the end of the first
(e.g. Fig. 2B).
We let θn denote the probability that the starting and ending nodes of an n-step random
walk in layer one both employ the same strategy. For example, θ1 quantifies the correlation, or
assortment, of strategies between neighboring nodes in layer one. Similarly, we let φn,m denote
the probability that the starting and ending nodes of an (n, m)-step random employ the same
strategy. For example, φ0,1 quantifies the strategy assortment between a node in layer one and a
random neighbor in layer two. We can obtain θn and φn,m by solving systems of O
(
N2
)
linear
equations (see Methods).
For any two-layer population structure and any initial strategy configuration, we have derived
a general condition for when cooperation in layer one is favored by selection:
θ1b1 + φ0,1b2 − θ0c− φ0,0c > θ3b1 + φ2,1b2 − θ2c− φ2,0c. (2)
Informally, this condition states that a cooperative neighbor of a node in layer one must have
a higher payoff than a random neighbor. The four terms on the left side quantify the benefits
and costs to a cooperative neighbor, where θ1b1 and θ0c denote the benefits and costs from layer
one, and φ0,1b2 and φ0,0c denote the benefits and costs from layer two. The four terms on the
right quantify the benefits and costs to a random neighbor, where θ3b1 and θ2c (respectively
φ2,1b2 and φ2,0c) denote the benefits and costs from layer one (layer two). These eight quantities
collectively govern the fate of cooperation in multilayer networks, as depicted in Fig. 2. A special
case of equation (2) is when layer one evolves independently from layer two, so that there are no
benefits and costs arising from layer two, in which case selection favors cooperation whenever
θ1b1 − θ0c > θ3b1 − θ2c.
2.2 Coupled ring networks
The general rule derived above allows one to study how multiple domains of social interactions
influence the prospects for cooperation, in arbitrary interaction networks. We start with an
illustrative example based on a two-layer ring network. We consider N = 10 individuals are
arranged in a ring, each with two neighbors in each layer. Initially, a single individual in each
layer is cooperative, and the cooperator in layer one is connected to the cooperator in layer
two (see Fig. 3A). When the two layers evolve independently, or in the absence of layer two,
cooperation is favored by selection in layer one only if the benefit-to-cost ratio, b1/c, exceeds a
critical value, (b1/c)∗ = 8/3 (dashed vertical line in Fig. 3B). But when the two layers are coupled
and b2/c = 10, then critical value (b1/c)∗ is reduced to 1.74 (solid vertical line in Fig. 3B). In other
words, coupling games between layers promotes cooperation in layer one, making it far easier to
evolve than in the absence of layer two. The reason is that, when layers are coupled, a player’s
success in one layer depends not only on her payoffs obtained in that layer, but also on her
interactions in the other layer. In this case, the cooperator in layer one is being exploited by
two neighboring defectors, as seen in Fig. 3A, but nonetheless she receives an extra benefit from
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Figure 2: General rule for the evolution of cooperation in multilayer populations. We consider what happens when
individual i is chosen to update her strategy in layer one, and her neighbors compete to have their strategy copied.
Cooperation will be selectively favored in layer one if a cooperative neighbor, node j, has greater expected payoff than
a random neighbor, node `. Node j receives an average benefit b1θ1 from its own one-step neighbors in layer one
(panel A, left). Node j also receives an average benefit b2φ0,1 from its own one-step neighbors in layer two (panel A,
right). The expression for θ1 (respectively φ0,1) accounts for the probability p
[1]
jk (p
[2]
jk ) that a random walk moves from
node j to k in layer one (layer two); and for the probability β jk (γjk) that node k has the same strategy in layer one
(layer two) as node j has in layer one (see also Supporting Information). Node j pays the cost cθ0 as a cooperator in
layer one and cφ0,0 in layer two. Node j’s net payoff is therefore θ1b1 + φ0,1b2 − (θ0c + φ0,0c). Any competitor of j,
such as node `, is also vying to have its strategy copied. Note that in layer one, node ` is two steps away from node
j. Node ` receives an average benefit b1θ3 (respectively b2φ2,1) from its one-step neighbors in layer one (layer two),
who are three steps away in layer one (two steps away in layer one and one step away in layer two) from node j, as
shown in panel B. Whenever ` is a cooperator she pays cost c, leading to an average cost θ2c in layer one and φ2,0c in
layer two (panel C). Node `’s net payoff is therefore θ3b1 + φ2,1b2 − (θ2 + φ2,0)c. Selection will favor cooperation only
if θ1b1 + φ0,1b2 − θ0c− φ0,0c > θ3b1 + φ2,1b2 − (θ2 + φ2,0)c.
a cooperative neighbor in layer two, who increases her fitness and promotes the spread of her
(cooperative) strategy in layer one (see also SFig. 3 for further details).
Figure 4 illustrates more generally how multilayer coupling affects evolutionary dynamics
in ring networks. When the two layers evolve separately, cooperation is favored in layer one
only if b1/c exceeds the olive dashed line; and cooperation is favored in layer two only if b2/c
exceeds the blue dashed line. Selection thus favors cooperation in both layers only when b1/c
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Figure 3: Multilayer games can promote cooperation. (A) We consider a “ring network” in each layer, with each
node connected to two neighboring nodes. Nodes that occupy the same position in both layers represent the same
individual, as indicated by the dashed line. The initial strategy configuration contains one cooperative individual in
layer one (blue) and one cooperative individual in layer two (blue). (B) The probability that cooperation will eventually
fix in layer one. We compare two scenarios: when the layers operate independently (open squares) versus when the
two layers are coupled (solid squares). Cooperation in layer one is favored by selection if it fixes with a greater
probability than in the absence of selection (horizontal line). According to our analytical prediction, cooperation will
be favored whenever the benefit-to-cost ratio (b1/c) exceeds a critical value, indicated by the solid vertical line (for
coupled layers) and by the dashed vertical line (for independent layers). For the benefit-to-cost ratios indicated in
light blue, coupling between layers promotes cooperation in layer one even though it would be disfavored by selection
under evolution in layer one alone. Dots indicate results from 107 replicate Monte Carlo simulations. Parameters:
b2 = 10, c = 1, and δ = 0.02.
and b2/c lie in region κ. Coupling layers moves the benefit-to-cost ratio required for cooperation
in layer one to olive solid line, and it moves the benefit-to-cost ratio required in layer two to
blue solid line – in both cases expanding the parameter range of costs and benefits that favor
cooperation. In particular, the region λ reveals the remarkable fact that even if cooperation is
disfavored by selection in each layer alone, cooperation can nonetheless be favored in both layers
simultaneously when they are coupled.
In the two-layer ring network, for any configuration with only one cooperator in layer one and
one cooperator in layer two, we have derived a simple formula to calculate the critical benefit-
to-cost ratio (b1/c)
∗ required to favor cooperation (see Methods). For more complicated initial
configurations we can still resort to the general condition (equation (2)) to obtain theoretical
predictions, although the expressions are more complicated. Even among these simple graphs
we find a diverse range of scenarios in which multiplayer coupling promotes cooperation (see
SFig. 4).
2.3 Coupled heterogeneous networks
For ring networks, cooperation is favored in each layer alone provided the benefit-to-cost ratio
exceeds some critical value. Coupling between layers can reduce the critical value and thereby
promote cooperation. However, the prospects for cooperation may be far worse in other popu-
lation structures. In fact, there are many single-layer population structures in which cooperation
is never favored in a social dilemma, no matter how large the benefit-to-cost ratio [11, 23, 24].
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Figure 4: When coupling promotes cooperation. We analyze a two-layer ring network with the initial strategy
configuration shown in Fig. 3A. If the population evolves in layer one alone, then cooperation is favored by selection
only when b1/c exceeds the olive dashed line. Coupling with layer two facilitates the evolution of cooperation in layer
one, decreasing the required benefit-to-cost ratio from the olive dashed line to the olive solid line. If the population
evolves in layer two alone, cooperation is favored by selection only when b2/c exceeds the blue dashed line. Coupling
with layer one facilitates the evolution of cooperation in layer two, decreasing the required benefit-to-cost ratio to the
blue solid line. Without coupling, selection favors cooperation in both layers only in region κ. But coupling extends
that region to κµλν. Note that in region λ, cooperation is disfavored in each layer on its own, but it is favored in both
layers when they are coupled.
The star graph is an example of a population structure that always suppresses coopera-
tion. The graph consists of a central hub and N − 1 leaf nodes. Regardless of the initial
strategy configuration, no finite value of the benefit-to-cost ratio can selectively favor coop-
eration (i.e. (b1/c)
∗ = ∞). Nonetheless, if we couple two stars in a certain way (Fig. 5A)
then selection favors cooperation in both stars simultaneously provided b1/c and b2/c exceed(
18N4 − 55N3 + 64N2 − 33N + 6) / (4N3 − 2N2) (see Supporting Information for detailed deriva-
tions). The region λ in Fig. 5A depicts the benefit-to-cost ratios that favor cooperation in these
two-layer graphs.
An even more striking example occurs on the wheel network, shown in Fig. 5B. For any initial
strategy configuration on such networks, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio is negative, (b1/c)
∗ < 0
– meaning that selection actually favors spite, an antisocial behavior where an individual pays
a cost to decrease her neighbor’s payoff. But if we couple one wheel network with another, as
shown in Fig. 5B, cooperation can be favored on both layers, provided b1/c and b2/c lie in region
λ. Together with the star network, this example shows that coupling can promote cooperation in
multiple layers, even if selection always disfavors cooperation in each layer alone.
Our framework also applies to mutilayer populations with different population sizes in dif-
ferent layers. That is, a player may have social interactions in layer one, but no social interactions
in layer two (see examples in Fig. 5C and D) – corresponding, for example, to an individual who
forgoes online social networking altogether. Figure 5C and D confirm that in such cases coupling
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Figure 5: Multilayer coupling can promote cooperation even when cooperation is disfavored in individual layers.
We present five representative examples. (A) In each layer alone, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio is infinite, i.e.
(b1/c)
∗ = (b2/c)∗ = ∞. As a result, cooperation is never favored by selection, regardless of how large the benefit-
to-cost ratio is. Nevertheless, when the two layers are coupled, selection then favors cooperation in both layers,
provided b1/c and b2/c fall within the region λ. (B) In each layer alone, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio is negative,
i.e. (b1/c)
∗ , (b2/c)∗ < 0. These negative ratios indicate that selection can favor the fixation of spite in each layer
alone—so that an individual will pay a cost of c > 0 to decrease his partner’s payoff. Nevertheless, when the two
layers are coupled, selection then favors cooperation in both layers, provided b1/c and b2/c fall within the region λ.
Multilayer networks can also rescue cooperation when there are different population sizes in different layers (C, D),
or for populations with more than two layers (E). In (C) and (D), open circles indicate absence of a node in that layer.
can still allow cooperation to be favored in both layers, even if cooperation is disfavored in each
layer alone for any benefit-to-cost ratio. In such populations with different population sizes in
different layers the general rule for the evolution of cooperation is analogous to equation (2) (see
Supporting Information).
Our framework also applies to multilayer populations with an arbitrary number of layers.
Figure 5E illustrates an example of three-layer population. When the three layers evolve indepen-
dently, cooperation is favored neither in layer one ((b1/c)
∗ < 0) nor in layer three ((b3/c)∗ = ∞).
Coupling the three layers allows selection to favor cooperation, provided benefit-to-cost ratios lie
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in the three-dimensional region λ. In particular, coupling not only makes it possible for cooper-
ation to be favored in layer one and layer three, but it also reduces the value of b2/c required for
cooperation being favored in layer two. Therefore, the coupling of more layers can provide more
opportunities for the evolution of cooperation. In Supporting Information, we derive the general
condition for selection to favor cooperation on population structures with an arbitrary number
of layers.
2.4 Small multilayer populations
To study behavioral dynamics across a variety of structures, we have systematically analyzed all
two-layer networks of size N = 3, 4, 5, 6 and all initial configurations of a single cooperator in
each layer (see Methods for details). We first report the proportion of single-layer networks and
strategy configurations in which cooperation can be favored in layer one alone for some choice
of benefit-to-cost ratio (i.e. (b1/c)
∗ > 0, blue bars in Fig. 6). Coupling layer one with a randomly
chosen network and strategy configuration in layer two can significantly increases the frequency
of structures on which selection favors cooperation in layer one, for some values b1/c > 0 and
b2/c > 0 (red bar). Coupling layer one with a deliberately designed network and configuration
in layer two can further increase the frequency of cooperation (green bar). In a large proportion
of these cases, coupling to either a random or a designed network in layer two, selection actually
favors cooperation in both layers simultaneously (SFig. 5). Therefore, in a systematic analysis
of all small structures, multilayer networks have a significant positive impact on prospects for
cooperation.
2.5 Larger multilayer populations
The networks explored above are all relatively small, but they nonetheless exhibit a diverse range
of behavioral dynamics and surprising effects induced by multilayer coupling. To study behavior
on larger networks we sampled many two-layer Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random networks[40] and two-layer
scale-free networks[41] of size N = 50 individuals. We sampled such networks across a diverse
range of average node degrees in layer one and in layer two (see Fig. 7A). In each two-layer net-
work we placed a single mutant cooperator in each layer and analyzed all 50× 50 = 2, 500 initial
strategy configurations. Figure 7A and B report the frequency of structures for which selection
can favor cooperation in both layers for some positive values of b1/c and b2/c. Compared with
the corresponding frequencies when the two layers evolve separately (see SFig. 6), we find that
coupling two layers is broadly conducive to selection for cooperation, as shown in the highlighted
area in Fig. 7A and B. In particular, in the random networks with average degree greater than 26,
cooperation is never favored for any benefit-to-cost ratio. Coupling such networks to a random
network in layer two can often rescue cooperation (dark red area in Fig. 7A). Figure 7C and D
show examples of random and scale-free two-layer networks that favor the evolution of spite on
each layer alone, but that can favor cooperation on both layers when coupled (see also SFig. 7
and SFig. 8 for further analysis and examples).
2.6 Empirical multilayer populations
We also studied six real-world examples of communities engaged in multiple domains of social
interaction. The six empirical two-layer networks [28–32] range from online and offline rela-
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Figure 6: Proportion of small networks that permit the evolution of cooperation. We systematically analyzed all
networks of size N = 3, 4, 5, 6, including all initial configurations containing a single cooperator. Blue bars indicate the
proportion of single-layer networks and mutant configurations in which selection can favor cooperation in layer one
for some benefit-to-cost ratio, i.e. (b1/c)
∗ > 0. For N = 3, selection does not favor cooperation for any network and
configuration, for any value of b1/c. Coupling layer one with a randomly chosen network and strategy configuration
in layer two increases the frequency of selection for cooperation (i.e. selection favors cooperation in layer one for
some choice of b1/c > 0 and b2/c > 0, shown in red). Coupling layer one with a deliberately designed network and
strategy configuration in layer two further increases the frequency of cooperation in layer one (green). In a majority
of these cases, coupling to either a random or a designed network in layer two, selection actually favors cooperation
in both layers simultaneously (see SFig. 5).
tionships among members of the Computer Science Department at Aarhus University, to the
marriage and business relationships among prominent families in renaissance Florence, and they
range in population size from N = 21 to N = 71 (Fig. 8). We analyzed the prospects for coopera-
tion when individuals play donation games in each layer, including all initial configurations with
a single cooperator in each layer. In all of these empirical networks, even if two layers evolve sep-
arately cooperation can be favored in each layer provided the benefit-to-cost ratios are sufficiently
large. Coupling the two layers can nonetheless reduce the benefit-to-cost ratios required to sup-
port cooperation. Figure 8A shows the proportions of initial configurations for which coupling
facilitates cooperation in this way. Figure 8C shows an example of this phenomenon, using the
two-layer network of socio-emotional and professional relationships among customers surveyed
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Figure 7: Multilayer coupling can catalyze the evolution of cooperation in random and scale-free populations. We
sampled 100 two-layer Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random networks of size N = 50, and 100 two-layer scale-free networks of size
N = 50, for each pair of average node degrees, k1 and k2, in layers one and two, respectively. For each two-layer
network we analyzed all 2,500 initial configurations consisting of a single mutant cooperator in each layer. (A) The
proportion (percentage) of sampled two-layer random networks and initial configurations in which selection can favor
cooperation in both layers, for some positive values of b1/c and b2/c. Highlighted entries indicate regimes when cou-
pling increases the frequency of selection for cooperation in both layers compared to independent evolution in each
layer. Coupling can have a dramatic effect—e.g. favoring cooperation in both layers for nearly 50% of sampled net-
works, compared to virtually never favoring cooperation without coupling (see SFig. 6). For some regimes, coupling
permits selection for cooperation in both layers even though one or both layers oppose its selection in the absence
of coupling (dark red). (B) The proportion (percentage) of sampled two-layer scale-free networks and initial config-
urations in which selection can favor cooperation in both layers; highlighted entries indicate regimes when coupling
increases the frequency of selection for cooperation in both layers compared to independent evolution in each layer.
(C) and (D) Examples of two-layer random and scale-free networks, respectively, in which spite is favored on each
layer evolving independently, but cooperation is favored in both layers when coupled.
in a Zambian tailor shop; coupling these two domains of social interaction facilitates cooperation
in both domains, by reducing the benefit-to-cost ratios required to favor prosocial behavior.
The behavioral outcome in one layer may be more important than in another layer, such
as when more individuals appear in one layer, or when prosociality in one domain is more
important for the overall welfare of a society. To study this in the context of real-world multilayer
networks, we analyzed to what degree the benefit-to-cost ratio for cooperation to be favored in
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Figure 8: Evolution of cooperation in six real-world two-layer networks. We analyzed networks of online and
offline relationships among 61 employees of the Computer Science Department at Aarhus University (CA) [28]; social-
emotional and professional relationships among 39 customers surveyed in a Zambian tailor shop (KTS) [29]; friendship
and professional relationships among 21 managers at a high-tech company (KHT) [30]; friendship and professional
relationships among 71 partners at the Lazega Law Firm (LLF) [31]; marriage and business relationships among 16
families in renaissance Florence (PFF) [32]; and friendship and scholastic relationships among 29 seventh-grade stu-
dents in Victoria, Australia (VC7). We considered all initial configurations with a single mutant cooperator in each
layer, where individuals play the donation game. (A) Proportion of configurations in which coupling layers reduces
benefit-to-cost ratios required for cooperation to be favored in both layers, relative to when layers evolve indepen-
dently. (B) Proportion of initial configurations in which coupling layers reduces the benefit-to-cost ratio required for
cooperation to be favored in layer one. (C-E) Three example configurations with a single mutant cooperator (blue)
among defectors (red), where open circles indicate isolated individuals. In these examples, selection favors cooper-
ation in each layer alone provided the benefit-to-cost ratio exceeds a critical value, e.g. (b1/c)
∗ = 93.3 in KTS layer
one. Coupling layers reduces the benefit-to-cost ratio required for cooperation to evolve in one or both layers. For
example, when b1/c = 74.9 and b2/c = 14.2, selection favors cooperation in both layers of the coupled KTS network.
layer one alone can be reduced. (In these analyses the prospect for cooperation in the second
layer is left uncontrolled, and so cooperation might be disfavored in layer two.) We find that in
all six empirical two-layer networks, and for nearly all initial configurations, a proper choice of
benefits and costs in layer two can serve to lower the critical benefit-to-cost ratio required for the
evolution of cooperation in layer one (Fig. 8B). Remarkably, we find that the critical benefit-to-cost
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ratio in layer one can sometimes be reduced to zero by coupling (SFig. 9), which indicates that
cooperation can be favored in layer one despite providing no immediate benefit in that domain
at all. This dramatic effect of coupling occurs for more than 25% initial configurations in the six
empirical networks. The spatial arrangement of cooperators strongly affects whether the required
benefit-to-cost ratio can be reduced all the way to zero by coupling. In general, the closer two
initial cooperators, one in each layer, the more likely that coupling can catalyze cooperation in
layer one even without providing any immediate layer-one benefit (SFig. 10). Aside from the
six empirical networks, we also illustrate this phenomenon in two-layer random networks and
two-layer scale-free networks (SFig. 11 and 12).
3 Discussion
One of the many complexities of human societies is the structure of our social interactions.
Structure is not confined to a single type of interaction, but includes the distinct domains of rela-
tionships in which we interact. This feature would not complicate the problem of understanding
behavior if interactions and standing in one domain had no influence on other domains. But that
is emphatically not the case. A person with a large online following, for example, can leverage
this for success and appeal in professional relationships; and someone with success in business
can garner support in politics or even religion. The empirical impact of coupling between do-
mains can be dramatic, as exemplified by the famous Medici family of renaissance Florence [32],
but also in modern times. Understanding coupling between domains of social interaction is
therefore critical to understanding what drives prosocial and selfish behavior in societies.
We have modelled the evolution of prosocial behaviors across domains using multilayer net-
works, where each individual uses separate strategies and plays distinct games in different layers.
An individual’s total payoff across domains determines his or her influence over peers. We find
that the threshold for selection to favor cooperation in a multilayer population can be much lower
than it is in a single-layer population [19, 23]. For a large portion of multilayer populations, cou-
pling can promote cooperation in all layers, even when cooperation is disfavored in each layer
alone. And so the prospects for cooperation are fundamentally changed when social interactions
occur in distinct, but coupled, domains.
Our results have been derived in a completely general mathematical framework, whose power
we have illustrated through systematic analysis of all small networks, as well as extensive sam-
pling of larger random and scale-free networks. We have also analyzed six empirical two-layer
networks across diverse real-world communities, where we find that coupling promotes the
spread of prosocial behavior, especially by strategic design of incentives in one layer. Our anal-
ysis of these six empirical networks has been confined to the simple donation game, which is
not a perfectly accurate description of the all the real-world social interactions that occur in these
empirical settings. But this simple model hopefully captures the key, qualitative tension between
prosocial, selfish, and even antisocial behavior [11, 12, 15, 19, 23, 27]. The qualitative conclusions
we draw from it are driven by the empirical network structures and the behavioral dynamics that
arise when individuals garner influence across domains.
Our work has several implications for the evolution of prosocial behavior, both in theory and
practice. The first noteworthy implication is the importance of coordinating benefit-to-cost ratios
between layers (i.e. b1/c and b2/c). If selection favors cooperation for some positive benefit-to-
cost ratio in a single-layer network, then it does so for any larger ratio. In a multilayer network,
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however, the condition for cooperation to be favored depends on benefit-to-cost ratios in both
layers (equation (2)). Increasing b1/c unilaterally can actually result in selection against coopera-
tion. Intriguingly, we find that in up to 40% of the two-layer networks we examined, cooperation
can be favored in layer one even when there is no immediate benefit of cooperation in that layer
(b1/c near zero), provided the benefits in layer two are sufficiently large.
Another important implication concerns how to design or modify interactions in one domain
in order to promote cooperation in another, or in both. Indeed, not every multilayer structure is
beneficial for cooperation, and so one can ask whether it is possible to slightly modify interac-
tions in one layer to promote cooperation in both layers. Although this question is quite deep
and difficult for full mathematical analysis, we have analyzed it systematically in all two-layer
networks of size 6 (See SFig. 13). In these cases we find that adding or severing a small number
of connections in layer two, if done properly, can rescue cooperation in both layers. Investigating
this question in greater generality is a worthwhile avenue for future study, with clear practical
implications.
Several prior studies have demonstrated that selection cannot favor cooperation in a single-
layer structured population under birth-death or pairwise-comparison updating [19, 42–44].
More recent studies have found that game transitions [45] and heterogeneous distributions of
social goods [25] can catalyze cooperation under these update rules. Here, too, we find that a
simple coupling of layers works efficiently to make cooperation favored by selection under birth-
death or pairwise-comparison updating (see SFig. 14). In practice, there may be considerable
cultural differences between domains, it is not unreasonable to expect that the mechanisms of
imitation and learning differ between layers. The multilayer approach also allows for such a
mixture of update rules in different layers (see Supporting Information).
The literature on evolutionary game theory commonly assumes that new types (innovations
or mutations) appear uniformly at random within a population. This assumption simplifies
the mathematical analysis of population dynamics, and it is also scientifically reasonable when
death rates are uniform and mutants are initially rare [12–16, 19, 23]. However, non-uniform
arrangements of mutants can lead to completely different outcomes. For example, one arrange-
ment might favor cooperation while another suppresses it [46], as we have seen in the multilayer
context as well. More generally, we have proven that when the mutant in a layer is introduced
randomly and uniformly, then the threshold required for cooperation to be favored is indepen-
dent of the other layers (see SFig. 15 and Supporting Information). In other words, averaging the
dynamics over a uniform initial mutant distribution obscures the effects of one layer on another.
And so we conclude that the common assumption used in the field turns out to be pathological
special case that is not representative of the effects of mutation in general.
Our study of multilayer games has used single-layer networks as the primary reference point
for comparison. However, there are substantial similarities between the process we study here
and evolutionary set theory [12], a framework in which different sets represent different social
categories (or different types of social relationships), and each individual falls into one or more
of these sets. The crucial difference between evolutionary set theory and multilayer networks is
that, in the former, individuals adopt a single strategy and apply it against all other members
of his or her set(s); and set membership can change in time. In our setting, on the other hand,
domain membership is fixed but we allow for separate behaviors in different domains of inter-
actions. In this sense, the framework of multilayer networks is orthogonal to evolutionary set
theory. Moreover, in the context of multilayer games it is not the strategy one uses in a layer that
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determines your influence in that layer; rather, all your strategies matter.
The last two decades have seen extensive investigation into the effects of spatial structure
on evolutionary games [10]. Most of these studies are based on a single (one-layer) population
structure, limited to one of a few different update rules. While the use of multilayer networks in
evolutionary dynamics is not new [35, 36], to our knowledge our work provides the first rigorous
mathematical results on evolution in multilayer populations. These results are applicable to an
arbitrary number of layers and any connectivity structure within each layer, and so they allow
for efficient exploration of diverse multilayer structures. They also apply to a broad class of
evolutionary update rules, including mixtures across layers. Many questions remain for future
work in this area, including the effects of different interaction and replacement structures in each
layer; the dynamics of producers of other kinds of social goods; the implications of strategy
“spillover” from one layer to another; and dynamic social categories that can change over time.
As modeling techniques grow more sophisticated to reflect the complexity of human and non-
human societies, a better empirical understanding of interdependence of social domains will be
crucial for predicting the dynamics of prosocial behaviors.
4 Methods
Here we briefly summarize our theoretical results on weak selection in multilayer populations,
and we refer to Supporting Information for detailed derivations. We consider a population
structure described by a two-layer network of size N, with edge weights
(
w[1]ij
)
i,j
in layer one and(
w[2]ij
)
i,j
in layer two. All edges are symmetric, i.e. w[1]ij = w
[1]
ji and w
[2]
ij = w
[2]
ji , and self loops are
not allowed. The weighted degree of node i is w[1]i = ∑
N
j=1 w
[1]
ij in layer one and w
[2]
i = ∑
N
j=1 w
[2]
ij
in layer two. The relative weighted degree of node i is thus pi[1]i = w
[1]
i /∑
N
j=1 w
[1]
j in layer one
and pi[2]i = w
[2]
i /∑
N
j=1 w
[2]
j in layer two. Under death-birth updating, the relative weighted degree
of i in a given layer corresponds to the so-called reproductive value of i in that layer [24, 47, 48],
which represents the contribution of i to future generations, in the absence of selection.
The evolutionary dynamics of death-birth updating in network-structured populations can be
described in terms of random walks on networks [23]. Here, too, random walks come into play,
but since we are dealing with multilayer networks we need to be clear about their definitions. In a
two-layer network, we define a random walk as follows. In layer one (resp. two), starting at node
i, a one-step walk terminates at node j with probability p[1]ij = w
[1]
ij /w
[1]
i (resp. p
[2]
ij = w
[2]
ij /w
[2]
i ).
Let
(
p[1]
)(n)
ij
denote the probability that a walker starting at node i terminates at node j after an
n-step random walk in layer one. We define an (n, m)-step random walk to be an n-step walk in
layer one followed by an m-step walk in layer two, where the beginning of the second random
walk corresponds to the end of the first. Let
(
p[1,2]
)(n,m)
ij
denote the probability that a walker
starting at node i terminates at node j after an (n, m)-step walk.
The effects of selection depend on the assortment of strategies within the network. In a two-
layer network, the spatial assortment involves not only strategies within the same layer but also
those in the other layer. Let βij denote the probability that, in layer one, both nodes i and j are
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cooperators under neutral drift. Similarly, let γij be the probability that both nodes i in layer one
and node j in layer two are cooperators. When i = j, we let βi denote βij and γi denote γij. For a
formal mathematical description of the underlying distribution, see Supporting Information.
If ξ is any initial strategy configuration, then ξ [L]i denotes is the strategy of node i in layer L.
The quantity then ξ̂[L] = ∑Ni=1 pi
[L]
i ξ
[L]
i represents the fixation probability of cooperators in layer L
under neutral drift (δ = 0) [24]. In Supporting Information, we show that one can obtain βij and
γij by solving the following linear system of equations,
βij =
N
2
(
ξ
[1]
i ξ
[1]
j − ξ̂[1]
)
+ 12 ∑
N
k=1 p
[1]
ik βkj +
1
2 ∑
N
k=1 p
[1]
jk βik,
βi = N
(
ξ
[1]
i − ξ̂[1]
)
+∑Nk=1 p
[1]
ik βk,
γij =
N2
2N−1
(
ξ
[1]
i ξ
[2]
j − ξ̂[1]ξ̂[2]
)
+ 12N−1 ∑
N
k1,k2=1 p
[1]
ik1
p[2]jk2γk1k2
+ N−12N−1 ∑
N
k1=1 p
[1]
ik1
γk1 j +
N−1
2N−1 ∑
N
k2=1 p
[2]
jk2
γik2 ,
(3)
together with the additional constraints ∑Ni=1 pi
[1]
i βi = 0 and ∑
N
i=1 pi
[1]
i γi = 0.
Using these quantities, we let θn = ∑Ni,j=1 pi
[1]
i
(
p[1]
)(n)
ij
βij, which means the probability that
both the starting and the ending nodes of an n-step random walk in layer one are cooperators,
where the starting node i is selected based on the reproductive value, pi[1]i . Analogously, for
the inter-layer random walk defined previously, we let φn,m = ∑Ni,j=1 pi
[1]
i
(
p[1,2]
)(n,m)
ij
γij. This
quantity represents the probability that the beginning of the walk in layer one and the end of
the walk in layer two both correspond to cooperators. Substituting θn and φn,m into equation (2)
then gives the condition for selection to favor cooperation. In Supporting Information, we give
examples illustrating how one can use network symmetry to obtain explicit expressions for these
quantities in simple multilayer populations. For general multilayer networks, we also provide
code for determining θ, φ, and evaluating equation (2).
4.1 Rule for evolutionary dynamics in a two-layer ring network
We now consider an example on a two-layer ring network, where (i) in each layer, a node is
connected to two other nodes; and (ii) node i is connected to j in layer one if and only if i’s
associated node is connected to j’s associated node in layer two (see Fig. 3A). We study the initial
strategy configuration of a single mutant cooperator in each layer. Let d be the shortest distance
between these two cooperator nodes. That is, if i is a cooperator in layer one and j is a cooperator
in layer two, then d is the length of the shortest path from i to j on the ring. When a node in
layer one and its associated node in layer two are cooperators, d = 0. The configuration shown
in Fig. 3A is an example with d = 1.
We find that cooperation is favored in the two-layer ring network only if equation (2) holds,
where θ1 = − (N − 1) /2, θ2 = − (N − 2) /2, θ3 = −3 (N − 2) /4,
φ0,1 = −
N−1
∑
`=1
cos 2pi`dN
2N − 1+ cos 2pi`N
, (4)
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φ2,0 =

−2 (N − 1) φ0,1 − N + 1 d = 0,
−2 (N − 1) φ0,1 + 1 d > 1,
(5)
and
φ2,1 =

(
4N2 − 6N + 3) φ0,1 + 2N2 − 4N + 3 d = 0,
(
4N2 − 6N + 3) φ0,1 − 52 N + 3 d = 1,(
4N2 − 6N + 3) φ0,1 − 2N + 3 d > 2.
(6)
4.2 Small multilayer populations
When mutant appearance is stochastic, the average fixation probability is used to measure which
spatial structure facilitates cooperation. For example, many prior studies have relied on the
assumption that a mutant cooperator appears in every node with the equal probability. By
averaging over all initial locations with respect to a fixed mutant-appearance distribution, the
remaining variables are population structure and the update rule. In addition to these two
components, we also consider a more fine-grained approach that takes into account the mutants’
initial positions within the population. In other words, we study the effects of spatial structure,
update rule, and the initial strategy configuration on evolutionary dynamics [26, 46].
We call the combination of a population structure and a mutant configuration a “profile.” In
a single-layer network, two profiles G and H are isomorphic if there is a bijection f : V (G) →
V (H) between the node sets of G and H such that (i) any two nodes i and j of G are adjacent if
and only if f (i) and f (j) are adjacent in H; and (ii) strategies of any node u of G and f (u) of H
are identical. Otherwise, the two profiles are non-isomorphic.
Similarly, a pair of two-layer profiles G and H are isomorphic if there is a bijection f :
V (G) → V (H) between the node sets of G and H such that (i) in each layer, any two nodes
i and j of G are adjacent if and only if in the same layer f (i) and f (j) of H are adjacent ; and
(ii) in each layer, the state of any node u of G and f (u) of H are identical. Otherwise, the two
profiles are non-isomorphic. Table SI.1 shows the number of non-isomorphic single-layer and
non-isomorphic two-layer profiles for networks of size N = 3, 4, 5, 6. Note that the total number
of non-isomorphic profiles is far greater for two-layer networks than single-layer ones. For ex-
ample, for N = 3 there are 26 non-isomorphic two-layer profiles compared to 3 such single-layer
profiles; and for N = 6 there are 36, 394, 472 non-isomorphic two-layer profiles compared to 407
such single-layer profiles.
We analyze all non-isomorphic single-layer profiles for N = 3, 4, 5, 6 to obtain the proportion
of profiles in which cooperation can be favored for some b1/c > 0 (blue bars in Fig. 6). When
randomly choosing two single-layer profiles, there are 407× 407 = 165, 649 combinations. We
take one as layer one and another as layer two. Since there are many ways for a node in layer one
to correspond to a node in layer two (i.e. a multilayer “superposition”), each combination can
actually produce many two-layer non-isomorphic profiles. Assuming that such a combination
generates X two-layer non-isomorphic profiles, and of them Y profiles make cooperation favored
for some positive b1/c and b2/c, we say coupling such two single-layer profiles makes coopera-
tion favored with probability Y/X. Analyzing all such combinations, we obtain the proportion
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of couplings of a single-layer profile to a random single-layer profile that favor cooperation in
both layers (see red bar in Fig. 6).
Acknowledgements.
We thank Erol Akc¸ay for helpful comments. This work is supported by the Simons Foundation
(Math+X Grant to the University of Pennsylvania) and the National Science Foundation (grant
DMS-1907583, 2042144).
19
Supporting Information
SI.1 Modeling evolutionary dynamics in multilayer populations
SI.1.1 Fixation probabilities under weak selection
We begin with populations with two layers. In each time step, we choose a replacement event,
(R,α), which consists of a pair
(
R[L], α[L]
)
for each layer, L, where α[L] : R[L] → {1, . . . , N} is the
offspring-to-parent map in layer L. We denote by p(R,α) (x) the probability of choosing (R,α) in
state x ∈ {0, 1}N × {0, 1}N , where x[L]i is 1 if individual i in layer L has type A and 0 otherwise.
We assume that p(R,α) (x) is a smooth function of δ in a small neighborhood of δ = 0 for every
x ∈ {0, 1}N × {0, 1}N and every replacement event (R,α).
In each layer, L, the map α[L] : R[L] → {1, . . . , N} extends to a map α˜[L] : {1, . . . , N} →
{1, . . . , N} defined by α˜[L] (i) = α[L] (i) if i ∈ R[L] and α˜[L] (i) = i if i 6∈ R[L]. For any state x ∈
{0, 1}N × {0, 1}N , we write x[L] ∈ {0, 1}N for the state of the population in layer L ∈ {1, 2}. This
extension of α, denoted α˜, gives an updated state xα˜ ∈ {0, 1}N × {0, 1}N defined by (xα˜)[L]i =
x[L]
α˜[L](i)
. For x, y ∈ {0, 1}N × {0, 1}N , we then have the transition probability
Px→y = ∑
(R,α)
xα˜=y
p(R,α) (x) . (SI.1)
In addition to being smooth, we assume that the replacement rule satisfies the following:
Fixation Axiom. There exists (i1, i2) ∈ {1, . . . , N} × {1, . . . , N}, an integer m > 1, and a sequence
of replacement events {(Rk,αk)}mk=1 such that (i) p(Rk ,αk) (x) > 0 for every k ∈ {1, . . . , m} and
x ∈ {0, 1}N × {0, 1}N ; (ii) for each L ∈ {1, 2}, there exists kL such that iL ∈ R[L]kL ; and (iii) for
L ∈ {1, 2}, we have α˜[L]1 ◦ α˜[L]2 ◦ · · · ◦ α˜[L]m (j) = iL for every j ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
As a consequence, at least a pair of locations (one in layer one and the other in layer two) can
spread their genetic material throughout the rest of the population within the same layer. The
Markov chain defined by Equation SI.1 has four absorbing states, AA, AB, BA, and BB. The first
part represents the absorbing state in layer one and the second part in layer two, where A (B)
corresponds to all-A (all-B) in each layer. As a result of the Fixation Axiom, all non-absorbing
states are transient, and eventually the process must reach an absorbing state.
In our analysis, it will be convenient to work with a process having a unique stationary dis-
tribution. To do so, we consider a mutation-modified chain obtained by sending each absorbing
state to a fixed, transient state ξ with probability u > 0. This chain has transition probabilities
P(ξ)x→y =

u x ∈ {AA, AB, BA, BB} , y = ξ,
(1− u) Px→y x ∈ {AA, AB, BA, BB} , y 6= ξ,
Px→y x 6∈ {AA, AB, BA, BB} ,
(SI.2)
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where (ξ) indicates that ξ is regenerated. By the Fixation Axiom, this chain has a unique closed
communication class and thus a unique stationary distribution, which we denote by pi(ξ).
The marginal probability that i transmits its offspring to j in layer L and in state x is
e[L]ij (x) := ∑
(R,α)
α[L](j)=i
p(R,α) (x) . (SI.3)
Let e◦[L]ij denote the marginal transmission probability from i to j (Equation SI.3) under neutral
drift (δ = 0), which we assume is independent of the state, x. The reproductive value (RV) of i
[24, 48, 49] in layer L, denoted pi[L]i , is (uniquely) defined by the system of equations
N
∑
j=1
e◦[L]ij pi
[L]
j = pi
[L]
i
N
∑
j=1
e◦[L]ji ; (SI.4a)
N
∑
i=1
pi
[L]
i = 1. (SI.4b)
Informally, this system says that the loss of “value” due to the death of i is offset by the “value”
i propagates throughout the population due to reproduction. This distribution on {1, . . . , N}
is convenient in what follows because the RV-weighted frequency of A in layer L, denoted by
x̂[L] := ∑Ni=1 pi
[L]
i x
[L]
i for x ∈ {0, 1}N × {0, 1}N , is a martingale under neutral drift [24].
In Equation SI.2, the change in RV-weighted frequency of A in layer L due to selection is
∆̂[L]sel (x) =
N
∑
i,j=1
pi
[L]
i
(
x[L]j − x[L]i
)
e[L]ji (x) . (SI.5)
Note that 4̂[L]sel(x) = 0 for x ∈ {AA, AB, BA, BB}. The overall change in RV-weighted frequency
of A in layer L (due to selection or mutation) is
∆̂[L] (x) =

−u
(
1− ξ̂ [L]
)
x[L] = A, x[−L] ∈ {A, B} ,
uξ̂ [L] x[L] = B, x[−L] ∈ {A, B} ,
∆̂[L]sel (x) x 6∈ {AA, AB, BA, BB} ,
(SI.6)
where −L indicates the other layer (i.e. not layer L). Since E(ξ)
[
∆̂[L]
]
= 0, taking L = 1 for
example, we have
0 = E(ξ)
[
∆̂[1]
]
= E(ξ)
[
∆̂[1]sel
]
− upi(ξ) ({A} × {A, B})
(
1− ξ̂ [1]
)
+ upi(ξ) ({B} × {A, B}) ξ̂ [1], (SI.7)
which gives
E(ξ)
[
∆̂[L]sel
]
=

upi(ξ)({A}×{A,B})(1−ξ̂ [L])
−upi(ξ)({B}×{A,B})ξ̂ [L]
L = 1,
upi(ξ)({A,B}×{A})(1−ξ̂ [L])
−upi(ξ)({A,B}×{B})ξ̂ [L]
L = 2,
(SI.8)
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where {A} × {A, B} indicates all cases that the state in layer one lies in {A} and the state in
layer two lies in {A, B} (analogous indications for other expressions). Let ρ[L]A (ξ) denote the
probability that the system becomes all-A in layer L, starting from ξ. By standard results on
rare-mutation evolutionary dynamics [26, 50], we have
lim
u→0
pi(ξ) ({A} × {A, B}) = ρ[1]A (ξ) ; (SI.9a)
lim
u→0
pi(ξ) ({B} × {A, B}) = 1− ρ[1]A (ξ) ; (SI.9b)
lim
u→0
pi(ξ) ({A, B} × {A}) = ρ[2]A (ξ) ; (SI.9c)
lim
u→0
pi(ξ) ({A, B} × {B}) = 1− ρ[2]A (ξ) . (SI.9d)
Differentiating Equation SI.8 with respect to u at u = 0 (and using Equation SI.9) gives
ρ
[L]
A (ξ) = ξ̂
[L] +
d
du
∣∣∣∣∣
u=0
E(ξ)
[
∆̂[L]sel
]
. (SI.10)
Since the transition functions are smooth in δ and u, we have
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
ρ
[L]
A (ξ) =
d
du
∣∣∣∣∣
u=0
E◦(ξ)
[
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
∆̂[L]sel
]
(SI.11)
(see Proposition 4 in paper [24]). This result is a two-layer generalization of Theorem 1 in paper
[26].
Finally, for x 6∈ {AA, AB, BA, BB}, consider the rare-mutation conditional distribution
piRMC(ξ) (x) := K
d
du
∣∣∣
u=0
pi(ξ) (x) , (SI.12)
where K :=
(
∑y 6∈{AA,AB,BA,BB} ddu
∣∣∣
u=0
pi(ξ) (y)
)−1
. The normalizing factor ensures that piRMC(ξ)
is a probability distribution on the non-absorbing states. This distribution satisfies:
Lemma 1. For any state function ϕ : {0, 1}N × {0, 1}N → R,
E◦RMC(ξ) [ϕ] = K
◦
(
ϕ(ξ)−ξ̂[1]ξ̂[2]ϕ(A,A)−ξ̂[1](1−ξ̂[2])ϕ(A,B)
−(1−ξ̂[1])ξ̂[2]ϕ(B,A)−(1−ξ̂[1])(1−ξ̂[2])ϕ(B,B)
)
+ ∑
(R,α)
p◦(R,α)E
◦
RMC(ξ) [ϕα˜] . (SI.13)
The proof of this result is a straightforward adaptation of that of Lemma 1 in paper [26] (details
omitted). Note that the state function ϕ (x) there is replaced with ϕ (ξ)− ξ̂[1]ξ̂[2]ϕ (A, A)
− ξ̂[1]
(
1− ξ̂[2]
)
ϕ (A, B)−
(
1− ξ̂[1]
)
ξ̂[2]ϕ (B, A)−
(
1− ξ̂[1]
) (
1− ξ̂[2]
)
ϕ (B, B).
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SI.1.2 Selection conditon for social goods
Suppose that B[L] and C[L] are matrices, with B[L]ij representing the benefit type A at location i
provides to location j (both in layer L). C[L]ij is the corresponding cost (to i) for providing B
[L]
ij to j.
Type B provides no benefits and incurs no costs. This formulation of payoffs allows for arbitrary
“social goods” [25], although for the sake of analysis we focus primarily on the case in which
B[L]ij = bL p
[L]
ji and C
[L]
ij = cL p
[L]
ij . In state x ∈ {0, 1}N × {0, 1}N , the total payoff to individual at
position k due to layer L is
u[L]k (x) =
N
∑
`=1
(
−x[L]k C[L]k` + x[L]` B[L]`k
)
. (SI.14)
We assume that the probability that i replaces j in layer L, e[L]ij , depends on a vector F ∈ [0,∞)N
that gives the fecundity values of the population. In traditional formulations, Fk = exp {δuk (x)},
where δ is the selection intensity and uk (x) is the payoff to individual k [21]. For multilayer
populations, the total payoff to k is uk (x) = u
[1]
k (x) + u
[2]
k (x). Letting m
[L]
k;ij be the marginal effect
of individual k’s fitness on the probability that i replaces j in layer L [25], i.e.
m[L]k;ij :=
de[L]ij
dFk
∣∣∣∣∣
F=1
, (SI.15)
we see that
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
e[L]ij (x) =
N
∑
k=1
m[L]k;ijuk (x) =
N
∑
k=1
m[L]k;ij
(
u[1]k (x) + u
[2]
k (x)
)
. (SI.16)
Thus, it follows from the definition of ∆̂[L]sel (x) that
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
∆̂[L]sel (x) =
N
∑
i,j,k=1
pi
[L]
i m
[L]
k;ji
(
x[L]j − x[L]i
) (
u[1]k (x) + u
[2]
k (x)
)
=
N
∑
i,j,k=1
pi
[L]
i m
[L]
k;ji
N
∑
`=1
(
−
(
x[L]j x
[1]
k −x[
L]
i x
[1]
k
)
C[1]k` +
(
x[L]j x
[1]
` −x[
L]
i x
[1]
`
)
B[1]`k
−
(
x[L]j x
[2]
k −x[
L]
i x
[2]
k
)
C[2]k` +
(
x[L]j x
[2]
` −x[
L]
i x
[2]
`
)
B[2]`k
)
. (SI.17)
The probability that individual i in layer L and individual j in layer L′ are both of type A in the
neutral RMC distribution is xξ[LL
′]
ij := E
◦
RMC(ξ)
[
x[L]i x
[L′]
j
]
. Taking the expectation of both sides of
Equation SI.17, combined with SI.11 and the definition of the RMC distribution, gives
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
ρ
[L]
A (ξ) =
1
K◦
E◦RMC(ξ)
[
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
∆̂[L]sel
]
=
1
K◦
N
∑
i,j,k=1
pi
[L]
i m
[L]
k;ji
N
∑
`=1
(
−
(
xξ[L1]jk −x
ξ[L1]
ik
)
C[1]k` +
(
xξ[L1]j` −x
ξ[L1]
i`
)
B[1]`k
−
(
xξ[L2]jk −x
ξ[L2]
ik
)
C[2]k` +
(
xξ[L2]j` −x
ξ[L2]
i`
)
B[2]`k
)
. (SI.18)
23
Without a loss of generality, we assume now that L = 1. To further simplify notation, let
β
ξ[1]
ij :=
xξ[11]ij
K◦
(SI.19)
(and βξ[1]i := β
ξ[1]
ii ). Using Lemma 1, these terms, which are associated to the first layer, satisfy
the recurrence
β
ξ[1]
ij = ξ
[1]
i ξ
[1]
j − ξ̂[1] + ∑
(R[1],α[1])
p◦
(R[1],α[1])
β
ξ[1]
α˜[1](i)α˜[1](j)
. (SI.20)
For the “cross terms,” which are associated to the two layers jointly, we let
γ
ξ[12]
ij :=
xξ[12]ij
K◦
. (SI.21)
From Lemma 1, these terms satisfy the recurrence relation
γ
ξ[12]
ij = ξ
[1]
i ξ
[2]
j − ξ̂[1]ξ̂[2] + ∑
(R[1],α[1])
(R[2],α[2])
p◦
(R[1],α[1])
p◦
(R[2],α[2])
γ
ξ[12]
α˜[1](i)α˜[2](j)
. (SI.22)
By Equation SI.18, we can then write
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
ρ
[1]
A (ξ) =
N
∑
i,j,k,`=1
pi
[1]
i m
[1]
k;ji
(
−
(
β
ξ[1]
jk −β
ξ[1]
ik
)
C[1]k` +
(
β
ξ[1]
j` −β
ξ[1]
i`
)
B[1]`k
−
(
γ
ξ[12]
jk −γ
ξ[12]
ik
)
C[2]k` +
(
γ
ξ[12]
j` −γ
ξ[12]
i`
)
B[2]`k
)
. (SI.23)
Note, however, that the recurrences of Equations SI.20 and SI.22 do not uniquely define βξ[1]ij
and γξ[12]ij , respectively. If β
ξ[1]
ij
(
resp. γξ[12]ij
)
is a solution to Equation SI.20
(
resp. Equation SI.22
)
,
then so is βξ[1]ij + C
(
resp. γξ[12]ij + C
)
for any C ∈ R. As a result of the Fixation Axiom, however,
the space of solutions to each recurrence is exactly one-dimensional, which means that these are
the only possible solutions. Moreover, since Equation SI.23 depends on differences of βξ[1]ij and
differences of γξ[12]ij , it is irrelevant which solution to these recurrences is used. Therefore, we
insist that
N
∑
i=1
pi
[1]
i β
ξ[1]
i = 0; (SI.24a)
N
∑
i=1
pi
[1]
i γ
ξ[12]
ii = 0. (SI.24b)
These conditions are arbitrary but ensure that Equations SI.20 and SI.22 have unique solutions.
From Equations SI.10 and SI.23, we have the following conclusion: compared with the neutral
drift(i.e., δ = 0), under the initial strategy configuration ξ, selection favors A-individuals in layer
one if and only if
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
ρ
[1]
A (ξ) > 0 ⇐⇒
N
∑
i,j,k,`=1
pi
[1]
i m
[1]
k;ji
(
−
(
β
ξ[1]
jk −β
ξ[1]
ik
)
C[1]k` +
(
β
ξ[1]
j` −β
ξ[1]
i`
)
B[1]`k
−
(
γ
ξ[12]
jk −γ
ξ[12]
ik
)
C[2]k` +
(
γ
ξ[12]
j` −γ
ξ[12]
i`
)
B[2]`k
)
> 0. (SI.25)
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Next, we compare the fixation probability of mutant As in a population consisting of Bs, i.e.
ρ
[1]
A (ξ), with the fixation probability of mutant Bs in a population consisting of As, i.e. ρ
[1]
B
(
ξ
)
.
We assume that in ξ and ξ, states in both layers are symmetric
(
ξ
[1]
i = 1− ξ [1]i and ξ
[2]
i = 1− ξ [2]i
for every i ∈ {1, · · · , N}). For ρ[1]A (ξ) > ρ[1]B (ξ) in a two-layer population, selection favors A-
individuals over B-individuals in layer one. Using the fact that ρ[1]B
(
ξ
)
= 1− ρ[1]A
(
ξ
)
, we see that
ρ
[1]
A (ξ) > ρ
[1]
B
(
ξ
) ⇐⇒ N∑
i,j,k,`=1
pi
[1]
i m
[1]
k;ji
(
−
(
β
ξ[1]
jk −β
ξ[1]
ik
)
C[1]k` +
(
β
ξ[1]
j` −β
ξ[1]
i`
)
B[1]`k
−
(
γ
ξ[12]
jk −γ
ξ[12]
ik
)
C[2]k` +
(
γ
ξ[12]
j` −γ
ξ[12]
i`
)
B[2]`k
)
> 0, (SI.26)
where
β
ξ[1]
ij = 2ξ
[1]
i ξ
[1]
j − ξ [1]i − ξ [1]j + ∑
(R[1],α[1])
p◦
(R[1],α[1])
β
ξ[1]
α˜[1](i)α˜[1](j)
(SI.27)
and
γ
ξ[12]
ij =2ξ
[1]
i ξ
[2]
j − ξ [1]i − ξ [2]j − 2ξ̂[1]ξ̂[2] + ξ̂[1] + ξ̂[2]
+ ∑
(R[1],α[1])
(R[2],α[2])
p◦
(R[1],α[1])
p◦
(R[2],α[2])
γ
ξ[12]
α˜[1](i)α˜[2](j)
, (SI.28)
along with two additional constraints (Equation SI.24).
SI.1.3 Reduction to a population with one layer
Let |ξ [1]| denote the number of As in ξ[1], Ξ[1] the set of all strategy configurations in layer one
that has |ξ [1]| As, and |Ξ[1]| the number of components in Ξ[1]. For example, for |ξ [1]| = 1,
there are N strategy configurations with an A and thus |Ξ[1]| = N. Suppose that the initial
strategy configuration in layer one is stochastic rather than deterministic, namely being selected
uniformly-at-random from Ξ[1]. Averaging Equation SI.23 over Ξ[1] gives
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
 1
|Ξ[1]| ∑
ξ[1]∈Ξ[1]
ρ
[1]
A
(
ξ[1], ξ[2]
)
=
N
∑
i,j,k,`=1
pi
[1]
i m
[1]
k;ji

−
(
∑
ξ[1]∈Ξ[1] β
ξ[1]
jk /|Ξ[1]|−∑ξ[1]∈Ξ[1] β
ξ[1]
ik /|Ξ[1]|
)
C[1]k`
+
(
∑
ξ[1]∈Ξ[1] β
ξ[1]
j` /|Ξ[1]|−∑ξ[1]∈Ξ[1] β
ξ[1]
i` /|Ξ[1]|
)
B[1]`k
−
(
∑
ξ[1]∈Ξ[1] γ
ξ[12]
jk /|Ξ[1]|−∑ξ[1]∈Ξ[1] γ
ξ[12]
ik /|Ξ[1]|
)
C[2]k`
+
(
∑
ξ[1]∈Ξ[1] γ
ξ[12]
j` /|Ξ[1]|−∑ξ[1]∈Ξ[1] γ
ξ[12]
i` /|Ξ[1]|
)
B[2]`k
 .
(SI.29)
Let γ[12]ij := ∑ξ[1]∈Ξ[1] γ
ξ[12]
ij /|Ξ[1]|. From Equation SI.22, we have the recurrence
γ
[12]
ij =
|ξ [1]|
N
(
ξ
[2]
j − ξ̂[2]
)
+ ∑
(R[1],α[1])
(R[2],α[2])
p◦
(R[1],α[1])
p◦
(R[2],α[2])
γ
[12]
α˜[1](i)α˜[2](j)
(SI.30)
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with constraint ∑Ni=1 pi
[1]
i γ
[12]
ii = 0. We consider a recurrence
χ
[2]
j =
|ξ [1]|
N
(
ξ
[2]
j − ξ̂[2]
)
+ ∑
(R[2],α[2])
p◦
(R[2],α[2])
χ
[2]
α˜[2](j)
, (SI.31)
with constraint ∑Nj=1 pi
[1]
j χ
[2]
j = 0, which can further be simplified to be
χ
[2]
j =
|ξ [1]|
N
(
ξ
[2]
j − ξ̂[2]
)
+
N
∑
`=1
(
e[2]`j
)◦
χ
[2]
` +
[
1−
(
d[2]j
)◦]
χ
[2]
j , (SI.32)
where
(
d[2]j
)◦
= ∑N`=1
(
e[2]`j
)◦
. Therefore, if Mij =
(
e[2]ji
)◦(
d[2]i
)◦ is the transition matrix for the ancestral
Markov chain in layer two, then
χ
ξ[2]
j =
|ξ [1]|
N
(
d[2]j
)◦ [ξ [2]j − ξ̂[2]]+ N∑
`=1
Mj`χ
ξ[2]
` . (SI.33)
Since
(
D[2]
)◦
=
[
pi
[2]
1
(
d[2]1
)◦
,pi[2]2
(
d[2]2
)◦
, · · · ,pi[2]N
(
d[2]N
)◦]
is stationary distribution for the an-
cestral Markov chain, and since
∑
j∈V
(
D[2]
)◦
j
|ξ [1]|
N
(
d[2]j
)◦ [ξ [2]j − ξ̂[2]] = 0, (SI.34)
it follows that the reduced system for χ[2]j , namely Equation SI.32, has a solution, which is also
unique. Since this solution also solves Equation SI.30 (which itself has a unique solution), it fol-
lows that the solution to Equation SI.30 must be independent of i. Thus, ∑ξ[1]∈Ξ[1] γ
ξ[12]
ik /|Ξ[1]| =
∑ξ[1]∈Ξ[1] γ
ξ[12]
jk /|Ξ[1]| for every i, j, k ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Besides, from Equations SI.15 and SI.20, both
m[1]k;ji and ∑ξ[1]∈Ξ[1] β
ξ[1]
ik /|Ξ[1]| in Equation SI.29 are independent of layer two. Overall, when in
layer one As are distributed randomly and with a uniform probability, the effects of weak selec-
tion on the fixation probability of A in layer one are independent of layer two, corresponding to
the dynamics in a single-layer population.
Defining β[1]ij := ∑ξ[1]∈Ξ[1] β
ξ[1]
ij /|Ξ[1]|, we arrive at
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
 1
|Ξ[1]| ∑
ξ[1]∈Ξ[1]
ρ
[1]
A
(
ξ[1], ξ[2]
) = N∑
i,j,k,`=1
pi
[1]
i m
[1]
k;ji
(
−
(
β
[1]
jk −β[
1]
ik
)
C[1]k`
+
(
β
[1]
j` −β[
1]
i`
)
B[1]`k
)
, (SI.35)
where β[1]i and β
[1]
ij can be obtained by solving
β
[1]
i = ∑(R[1],α[1]) p
◦
(R[1],α[1])
β
[1]
α˜[1](i)
β
[1]
ij =
|ξ [1]|(|ξ [1]|−N)
N(N−1) +∑(R[1],α[1]) p
◦
(R[1],α[1])
β
[1]
α˜[1](i)α˜[1](j)
(SI.36)
and constraint ∑Ni=1 pi
[1]
i β
[1]
i = 0.
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SI.2 Applications to specific update rules
Here, we consider applications of §SI.1 to death-birth (DB), pairwise-comparison (PC), and birth-
death (BD) updating. Again, we focus on layer one without the loss of generality. In each
case below, we assume that the population structure is an undirected, unweighted graph with
adjacency matrix
(
w[L]ij
)N
i,j=1
. Let w[L]i := ∑
N
j=1 w
[L]
ij denote node i’s degree in layer L. We consider
the random walk in a two-layer network: p[L]ij := w
[L]
ij /w
[L]
i is the probability of moving from node
i to j in a one-step random walk in the network of layer L,
(
p[L]
)(n)
ij
the probability of moving
from node i to j in a n-step walk in the network of layer L, and
(
p[1,2]
)(n,m)
ij
the probability that
a walker starting at node i in layer one terminates at node j in layer two after a n-step walk in
layer one and a following m-step walk in layer two (the beginning of the second random walk
corresponds to the end of the first).
SI.2.1 DB updating in both layers
Under DB updating, the marginal effect of k on j replacing i is
m[1]k;ji =
1
N
p[1]ij
(
δj,k − p[1]ik
)
. (SI.37)
Let fijk = −βξ[1]ij C[1]jk + βξ[1]ik B[1]kj − γξ[12]ij C[2]jk + γξ[12]ik B[2]kj . The reproductive value for DB updating is
pi
[1]
i = w
[1]
i /∑
N
k=1 w
[1]
k [24, 25]. Since pi
[1]
i p
[1]
ij = pi
[1]
j p
[1]
ji for every i and j, we have
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
ρ
[1]
A (ξ) =
N
∑
i,j,k,`=1
pi
[1]
i m
[1]
k;ji
(
f jk` − fik`
)
= − 1
N
N
∑
i,k,`=1
pi
[1]
i
(
p[1]
)(2)
ik
fik` +
1
N
N
∑
i,j,`=1
pi
[1]
j p
[1]
ji f jj`
+
1
N
N
∑
i,k,`=1
pi
[1]
i p
[1]
ik fik` −
1
N
N
∑
i,j,`=1
pi
[1]
i p
[1]
ij fij`
=
1
N
N
∑
i,`=1
pi
[1]
i fii` −
1
N
N
∑
i,j,`=1
pi
[1]
i
(
p[1]
)(2)
ij
fij`
=
1
N
N
∑
i=1
pi
[1]
i
N
∑
`=1
(
−βξ[1]ii C[1]i` +β
ξ[1]
i` B
[1]
`i
−γξ[12]ii C[2]i` +γ
ξ[12]
i` B
[2]
`i
)
− 1
N
N
∑
i,j=1
pi
[1]
i
(
p[1]
)(2)
ij
N
∑
`=1
(
−βξ[1]ij C[1]j` +β
ξ[1]
i` B
[1]
`j
−γξ[12]ij C[2]j` +γ
ξ[12]
i` B
[2]
`j
)
. (SI.38)
Therefore, ddδ
∣∣∣
δ=0
ρ
[1]
A (ξ) > 0 is satisfied if and only if
N
∑
i=1
pi
[1]
i
N
∑
`=1
(
−βξ[1]ii C[1]i` +β
ξ[1]
i` B
[1]
`i
−γξ[12]ii C[2]i` +γ
ξ[12]
i` B
[2]
`i
)
>
N
∑
i,j=1
pi
[1]
i
(
p[1]
)(2)
ij
N
∑
`=1
(
−βξ[1]ij C[1]j` +β
ξ[1]
i` B
[1]
`j
−γξ[12]ij C[2]j` +γ
ξ[12]
i` B
[2]
`j
)
. (SI.39)
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In particular, for B[L]ij = bL p
[L]
ji and C
[L]
ij = cp
[L]
ij , the above condition is
N
∑
i=1
pi
[1]
i
N
∑
`=1
(
−βξ[1]ii cp[1]i` +β
ξ[1]
i` b1 p
[1]
i`
−γξ[12]ii cp[2]i` +γ
ξ[12]
i` b2 p
[2]
i`
)
>
N
∑
i,j=1
pi
[1]
i
(
p[1]
)(2)
ij
N
∑
`=1
(
−βξ[1]ij cp[1]j` +β
ξ[1]
i` b1 p
[1]
j`
−γξ[12]ij cp[2]j` +γ
ξ[12]
i` b2 p
[2]
j`
)
. (SI.40)
Defining θξ[1]n = ∑Ni=1 pi
[1]
i
(
p[1]
)(n)
ij
β
ξ[1]
ij and φ
ξ[12]
n,m = ∑Ni=1 pi
[1]
i
(
p[1,2]
)(n,m)
ij
γ
ξ[12]
ij , we can write
Equation SI.40 to be(
θ
ξ[1]
1 − θξ[1]3
)
b1 +
(
φ
ξ[12]
0,1 − φξ[12]2,1
)
b2 +
(
θ
ξ[1]
2 + φ
ξ[12]
2,0
)
c > 0. (SI.41)
We now turn to Equations SI.20 and SI.22. For i = j,
β
ξ[1]
i = ξ
[1]
i − ξ̂[1] +
1
N
N
∑
k=1
p[1]ik β
ξ[1]
k +
(
1− 1
N
)
β
ξ[1]
i , (SI.42)
which gives
β
ξ[1]
i = N
(
ξ
[1]
i − ξ̂[1]
)
+
N
∑
k=1
p[1]ik β
ξ[1]
k . (SI.43)
For i 6= j,
β
ξ[1]
ij = ξ
[1]
i ξ
[1]
j − ξ̂[1] +
1
N
N
∑
k=1
p[1]ik β
ξ[1]
kj +
1
N
N
∑
k=1
p[1]jk β
ξ[1]
ik +
(
1− 2
N
)
β
ξ[1]
ij , (SI.44)
which gives
β
ξ[1]
ij =
N
2
(
ξ
[1]
i ξ
[1]
j − ξ̂[1]
)
+
1
2
N
∑
k=1
p[1]ik β
ξ[1]
kj +
1
2
N
∑
k=1
p[1]jk β
ξ[1]
ik . (SI.45)
For i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, the cross-terms satisfy
γ
ξ[12]
ij = ξ
[1]
i ξ
[2]
j − ξ̂[1]ξ̂[2] +
1
N2
N
∑
k1,k2=1
p[1]ik1 p
[2]
jk2
γ
ξ[12]
k1k2
+
1
N
(
1− 1
N
) N
∑
k1=1
p[1]ik1γ
ξ[12]
k1 j
+
1
N
(
1− 1
N
) N
∑
k2=1
p[2]jk2γ
ξ[12]
ik2
+
(
1− 1
N
)2
γ
ξ[12]
ij , (SI.46)
which gives
γ
ξ[12]
ij =
N2
2N − 1
(
ξ
[1]
i ξ
[2]
j − ξ̂[1]ξ̂[2]
)
+
1
2N − 1
N
∑
k1,k2=1
p[1]ik1 p
[2]
jk2
γ
ξ[12]
k1k2
+
N − 1
2N − 1
N
∑
k1=1
p[1]ik1γ
ξ[12]
k1 j
+
N − 1
2N − 1
N
∑
k2=1
p[2]jk2γ
ξ[12]
ik2
. (SI.47)
With the constraints of Equation SI.24, these recurrences have unique solutions.
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SI.2.2 PC updating in both layers
Under PC updating, the marginal effect of k on j replacing i is
m[1]k;ji =
1
4N
p[1]ij
(
δj,k − δi,k
)
. (SI.48)
As before, let fijk = −βξ[1]ij C[1]jk + βξ[1]ik B[1]kj − γξ[12]ij C[2]jk + γξ[12]ik B[2]kj . The reproductive value for PC
updating is again pi[1]i = w
[1]
i /∑
N
k=1 w
[1]
k [25]. The derivative of ρ
[1]
A (ξ) is then
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
ρ
[1]
A (ξ) =
N
∑
i,j,k,`=1
pi
[1]
i m
[1]
k;ji
(
f jk` − fik`
)
=
1
4N
N
∑
i,j,`=1
pi
[1]
i p
[1]
ij f jj` −
1
4N
N
∑
i,j,`=1
pi
[1]
i p
[1]
ij f ji`
− 1
4N
N
∑
i,j,`=1
pi
[1]
i p
[1]
ij fij` +
1
4N
N
∑
i,j,`=1
pi
[1]
i p
[1]
ij fii`
=
1
2N
N
∑
i,`=1
pi
[1]
i fii` −
1
2N
N
∑
i,j,`=1
pi
[1]
i p
[1]
ij fij`
=
1
2N
N
∑
i=1
pi
[1]
i
N
∑
`=1
(
−βξ[1]ii C[1]i` +β
ξ[1]
i` B
[1]
`i
−γξ[12]ii C[2]i` +γ
ξ[12]
i` B
[2]
`i
)
− 1
2N
N
∑
i,j=1
pi
[1]
i p
[1]
ij
N
∑
`=1
(
−βξ[1]ij C[1]j` +β
ξ[1]
i` B
[1]
`j
−γξ[12]ij C[2]j` +γ
ξ[12]
i` B
[2]
`j
)
. (SI.49)
Thus, ddδ
∣∣∣
δ=0
ρ
[1]
A (ξ) > 0 if and only if
N
∑
i=1
pi
[1]
i
N
∑
`=1
(
−βξ[1]ii C[1]i` +β
ξ[1]
i` B
[1]
`i
−γξ[12]ii C[2]i` +γ
ξ[12]
i` B
[2]
`i
)
>
N
∑
i,j=1
pi
[1]
i p
[1]
ij
N
∑
`=1
(
−βξ[1]ij C[1]j` +β
ξ[1]
i` B
[1]
`j
−γξ[12]ij C[2]j` +γ
ξ[12]
i` B
[2]
`j
)
. (SI.50)
In particular, for B[L]ij = bL p
[L]
ji and C
[L]
ij = cp
[L]
ij , this above condition is
N
∑
i=1
pi
[1]
i
N
∑
`=1
(
−βξ[1]ii cp[1]i` +β
ξ[1]
i` b1 p
[1]
i`
−γξ[12]ii cp[2]i` +γ
ξ[12]
i` b2 p
[2]
i`
)
>
N
∑
i,j=1
pi
[1]
i p
[1]
ij
N
∑
`=1
(
−βξ[1]ij cp[1]j` +β
ξ[1]
i` b1 p
[1]
j`
−γξ[12]ij cp[2]j` +γ
ξ[12]
i` b2 p
[2]
j`
)
, (SI.51)
which can be further written to be(
θ
ξ[1]
1 − θξ[1]2
)
b1 +
(
φ
ξ[12]
0,1 − φξ[12]1,1
)
b2 +
(
θ
ξ[1]
1 + φ
ξ[12]
1,0
)
c > 0. (SI.52)
Turning to Equations SI.20 and SI.22, we see that for i = j,
β
ξ[1]
i = ξ
[1]
i − ξ̂[1] +
1
2N
N
∑
k=1
p[1]ik β
ξ[1]
k +
(
1− 1
2N
)
β
ξ[1]
i , (SI.53)
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which gives
β
ξ[1]
i = 2N
(
ξ
[1]
i − ξ̂[1]
)
+
N
∑
k=1
p[1]ik β
ξ[1]
k . (SI.54)
For i 6= j,
β
ξ[1]
ij = ξ
[1]
i ξ
[1]
j − ξ̂[1] +
1
2N
N
∑
k=1
p[1]ik β
ξ[1]
kj
+
1
2N
N
∑
k=1
p[1]jk β
ξ[1]
ik +
(
1− 1
N
)
β
ξ[1]
ij , (SI.55)
which gives
β
ξ[1]
ij = N
(
ξ
[1]
i ξ
[1]
j − ξ̂[1]
)
+
1
2
N
∑
k=1
p[1]ik β
ξ[1]
kj +
1
2
N
∑
k=1
p[1]jk β
ξ[1]
ik . (SI.56)
Finally, for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, the cross-terms satisfy
γ
ξ[12]
ij = ξ
[1]
i ξ
[2]
j − ξ̂[1]ξ̂[2] +
1
4N2
N
∑
k1,k2=1
p[1]ik1 p
[2]
jk2
γ
ξ[12]
k1k2
+
1
2N
(
1− 1
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∑
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p[1]ik1γ
ξ[12]
k1 j
+
1
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(
1− 1
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∑
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ξ[12]
ik2
+
(
1− 1
2N
)2
γ
ξ[12]
ij , (SI.57)
which gives
γ
ξ[12]
ij =
4N2
4N − 1
(
ξ
[1]
i ξ
[2]
j − ξ̂[1]ξ̂[2]
)
+
1
4N − 1
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p[1]ik1 p
[2]
jk2
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k1k2
+
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p[1]ik1γ
ξ[12]
k1 j
+
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4N − 1
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p[2]jk2γ
ξ[12]
ik2
(SI.58)
Once again, these recurrences have unique solutions with the constraints of Equation SI.24.
SI.2.3 BD updating in both layers
Under BD updating, the marginal effect of k on j replacing i is
m[1]k;ji =
1
N
(
δj,k − 1N
)
p[1]ji . (SI.59)
As for the earlier cases, let fijk = −βξ[1]ij C[1]jk + βξ[1]ik B[1]kj − γξ[12]ij C[2]jk + γξ[12]ik B[2]kj . The reproductive
value for BD updating is pi[1]i =
(
w[1]i
)−1
/∑Nk=1
(
w[1]k
)−1
[25]. Therefore,
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
ρ
[1]
A (ξ) =
N
∑
i,j,k,`=1
pi
[1]
i m
[1]
k;ji
(
f jk` − fik`
)
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= − 1
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Thus, ddδ
∣∣∣
δ=0
ρ
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. (SI.61)
In particular, for B[L]ij = bL p
[L]
ji and C
[L]
ij = cp
[L]
ij , the above condition is
N
∑
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pi
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i p
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. (SI.62)
For i = j, we have
β
ξ[1]
i = ξ
[1]
i − ξ̂[1] + ∑
(R[1],α[1])
p◦
(R[1],α[1])
β
ξ[1]
α˜[1](i)
= ξ
[1]
i − ξ̂[1] +
1
N
N
∑
k=1
p[1]ki β
ξ[1]
k +
(
1− 1
N
N
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k=1
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)
β
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i , (SI.63)
which gives
β
ξ[1]
i =
N
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ξ
[1]
i − ξ̂[1]
)
+∑Nk=1 p
[1]
ki β
ξ[1]
k
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. (SI.64)
For i 6= j,
β
ξ[1]
ij = ξ
[1]
i ξ
[1]
j − ξ̂[1] + ∑
(R[1],α[1])
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β
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∑
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+(
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N
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∑
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1
N
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)
β
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ij , (SI.65)
which gives
β
ξ[1]
ij =
N
(
ξ
[1]
i ξ
[1]
j − ξ̂[1]
)
+∑Nk=1 p
[1]
ki β
ξ[1]
kj +∑
N
k=1 p
[1]
kj β
ξ[1]
ik
∑Nk=1 p
[1]
ki +∑
N
k=1 p
[1]
kj
. (SI.66)
Finally, we have
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which gives
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These recurrences give unique solutions with the constraints of Equation SI.24.
SI.2.4 Mixed DB and PC updating
Consider now the case in which the two layers are updated using different rules. We study two
cases here, with layer one always the layer of interest. In the first case, layers one and two undergo
DB and PC updating, respectively. Equation SI.38 remains the same, as does the recurrence for
β
ξ[1]
ij derived in §SI.2.1. The only modification necessary is to the cross-terms, γ
ξ[12]
ij . In the
second case, layers one and two undergo PC and DB updating, respectively. Similarly, both
Equation SI.49 and βξ[1]ij still hold from §SI.2.2, but we must make changes to the cross-terms,
γ
ξ[12]
ij .
SI.2.4.1 DB updating in layer one, PC updating in layer two
For i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, with DB updating in layer one and PC updating in layer two,
γ
ξ[12]
ij = ξ
[1]
i ξ
[2]
j − ξ̂[1]ξ̂[2] +
1
2N2
N
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+
1
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N
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(
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N
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ij , (SI.69)
giving
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. (SI.70)
These terms are the only modifications to §SI.2.1 needed to evaluate ddδ
∣∣∣
δ=0
ρ
[1]
A (ξ).
SI.2.4.2 PC updating in layer one, DB updating in layer two
For i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, with PC updating in layer one and DB updating in layer two,
γ
ξ[12]
ij = ξ
[1]
i ξ
[2]
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giving
γ
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j − ξ̂[1]ξ̂[2]
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+
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p[1]ik1 p
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These terms are the only modifications to §SI.2.2 needed to evaluate ddδ
∣∣∣
δ=0
ρ
[1]
A (ξ).
SI.3 Applications to specific networks
SI.3.1 Two-layer ring network
In this part, we show the application of Equation SI.41 in a two-layer ring network of size N.
Rings in two layers are symmetric, as shown in SFig.1. Initially, in each layer, there are an A-
individual and N − 1 B-individuals. Here we take ξ [1]1 = 1 and ξ [1]j = 0 for j 6= 1, ξ [2]i = 1 and
ξ
[2]
j = 0 for j 6= i. Let d denote the distance between positions of A-players in layer one and two,
namely the shortest distance between nodes 1 and i. For example, d is 1 in the configuration
illustrated in SFig.1.
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We begin with death-birth updating used in both layers. Substituting Equation SI.47 into
φ
ξ[12]
n,m gives
φ
ξ[12]
n,m =
1
2N − 1φ
ξ[12]
n+1,m+1 +
N − 1
2N − 1φ
ξ[12]
n+1,m +
N − 1
2N − 1φ
ξ[12]
n,m+1
+
N2
2N − 1
N
∑
i,j=1
pi
[1]
i
(
p[1,2]
)(n,m)
ij
ξ
[1]
i ξ
[2]
j −
N2
2N − 1 ξ̂
[1]ξ̂[2].
(SI.73)
Since the structures in both layers are symmetric,
(
p[1,2]
)(n,m)
ij
=
(
p[1]ij
)(n+m)
and φξ[12]n+1,m = φ
ξ[12]
n,m+1.
Defining φξ[12]n,m := φ
ξ[12]
n+m, we can rewrite Equation SI.73 as
φ
ξ[12]
n+m+2 − φξ[12]n+m+1 =(1− 2N)
(
φ
ξ[12]
n+m+1 − φξ[12]n+m
)
− N2
N
∑
i,j=1
pi
[1]
i
(
p[1]ij
)(n+m)
ξ
[1]
i ξ
[2]
j + N
2ξ̂[1]ξ̂[2]
= (1− 2N)n+m+1 (φξ[12]1 − φξ[12]0 )
− N2
n+m
∑
k=0
(1− 2N)k
[
N
∑
i,j=1
pi
[1]
i
(
p[1]ij
)(n+m−k)
ξ
[1]
i ξ
[2]
j − ξ̂[1]ξ̂[2]
]
.
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Using φξ[12]0 = 0, we arrive at
φ
ξ[12]
1 =
φ
ξ[12]
n+m+2 − φξ[12]n+m+1
(1− 2N)n+m+1 + N
2
n+m
∑
k=0
1
(1− 2N)k+1
[
pi
[1]
1
(
p[1]
)(k)
1i
− pi[1]1 pi[1]i
]
. (SI.75)
In the following, we calculate the quantity
(
p[1]
)(k)
1i
, the probability of moving from node 1 to i
in a ring network with N nodes in a k-step random walk. The Markov transition matrix for such
a symmetric random walk is given by a N × N matrix:
M =
1
2

0 1 0 · · · 0 1
1 0 1 · · · 0 0
0 1 0 · · · 0 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 · · · 0 1
1 0 0 · · · 1 0

. (SI.76)
Let pk be the vector of probabilities at the k−th step, so that the i-th component of pk is the
probability that the random walker is found at node i at step k. Then we have
pk+1 =Mpk, p0 =
(
1 0 0 · · · 0 0)T , (SI.77)
which gives
pk =M
kp0. (SI.78)
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A further analysis to M gives
M =
1
2
(
Q+QT
)
, (SI.79)
where
Q =

0 1 0 · · · 0 0
0 0 1 · · · 0 0
0 0 0 · · · 0 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 · · · 0 1
1 0 0 · · · 0 0

. (SI.80)
Since the column vectors of Q are orthonormal, it is an orthogonal matrix, i.e. QTQ = I . The
eigenvalues of Q, λ, satisfy
det (λI −Q) = λN − 1 = 0. (SI.81)
Then we have Q’s eigenvalues, given by the roots of unity
λ` = exp(iω`), ω` =
2pi`
N
, ` = 0, . . . , N − 1. (SI.82)
Letting v` =
(
1,λ`,λ2` , · · · ,λN−1`
)T
, it is easily seen that Qv` = λ`v`. Combining this equation
with QTQ = I , we have QTv` = Q−1v` = λ−1` v`. The eigenvalues λ` are distinct, and the vectors
v` form an orthogonal basis of CN (with respect to the standard sesquilinear inner product).
Using Equation SI.79, we have
Mv` =
1
2
(
λ` + λ
−1
`
)
v` = cos(ω`)v`. (SI.83)
Since v` form an orthogonal basis of CN , cos(ω`), ` = 0, · · · , N − 1, form the complete set of
eigenvalues of M . Based on the orthogonal basis v`, we have
p0 =
1
N
N−1
∑
`=0
v`, pk =M kp0 =
1
N
N
∑
`=0
(cos(ω`))
k v`. (SI.84)
We obtain (
p[1]
)(k)
1i
=
1
N
N−1
∑
`=0
(
cos
(
2pi`
N
))k
cos
(
2pi`(i− 1)
N
)
. (SI.85)
Furthermore, we have lim
n+m→∞
(
p[1]
)(n+m)
ij
= pi
[1]
j and limn+m→∞ φ
ξ[12]
n+m = ∑
N
i,j=1 pi
[1]
i pi
[2]
j γ
ξ[12]
i,j . In Equa-
tion SI.75, let n + m→ ∞, with Equation SI.85, we have
φ
ξ[12]
1 = −
N−1
∑
`=1
cos 2pi`(i−1)N
2N − 1+ cos 2pi`N
= −
N−1
∑
`=1
cos 2pi`dN
2N − 1+ cos 2pi`N
. (SI.86)
Applying the recurrence relation in Equation SI.75, we obtain
φ
ξ[12]
2 = −2(N − 1)φξ[12]1 − Nδd,0 + 1, (SI.87a)
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φ
ξ[12]
3 = (4N
2 − 6N + 3)φξ[12]1 −
N
2
δd,1 + 2N(N − 1)δd,0 − 2N + 3, (SI.87b)
where δi,j = 1 for i = j and 0 otherwise. Moreover, referring to Equation 70 in [26], we have
θ
ξ[1]
1 = −(N − 1)/2, θξ[1]2 = −(N − 2)/2, and θξ[1]3 = −3(N − 2)/4. Inserting θξ[1]1 , θξ[1]2 , θξ[1]3 ,
and φξ[12]0,1 = φ
ξ[12]
1 , φ
ξ[12]
2,0 = φ
ξ[12]
2 , φ
ξ[12]
2,1 = φ
ξ[12]
3 into Equation SI.41, we have the rule for A-
individuals replacing B-individuals in the two-layer ring network.
Next, we assume that pairwise-comparison (PC) updating is used in both layers. Using an
analysis analogous to that of Equations SI.73-SI.87, we see that
θ
ξ[1]
1 = 1− N; (SI.88a)
θ
ξ[1]
2 = 2− N; (SI.88b)
φ
ξ[12]
1,0 = −
N−1
∑
`=1
4 cos 2pi`dN
4N − 1+ cos 2pi`N
; (SI.88c)
φ
ξ[12]
0,1 = −
N−1
∑
`=1
4 cos 2pi`dN
4N − 1+ cos 2pi`N
; (SI.88d)
φ
ξ[12]
1,1 = (2− 4N)φξ[12]0,1 − 4Nδd,0 + 4. (SI.88e)
By substituting Equation SI.88 into Equation SI.52, we arrive at the rule for the evolution of
cooperation under PC updating. In particular, when the distance between two mutants is 1, i.e.
d = 1, we have φξ[12]0,1 − φξ[12]1,1 > 0. Therefore, even though cooperation can never evolve in layer
one alone for any b1/c under PC updating, coupling the two layers can favor cooperation in layer
one provided
b2
c
> −
(
θ
ξ[1]
1 − θξ[1]2
)
b1/c + θ
ξ[1]
1 + φ
ξ[12]
1,0
φ
ξ[12]
0,1 − φξ[12]1,1
. (SI.89)
SI.3.2 Two-layer star network
Here, we turn to the application of Equation SI.41 to a two-layer star network of size N, as shown
in SFig.2. We begin with death-birth updating in both layers. In this two-layer star network,
nodes 2, · · · , N − 1 are symmetric in terms of both structure and configuration, which gives
β
ξ[1]
2 = · · · = βξ[1]N−1. For simplicity, in the following, we denote βξ[1]1 by β1, βξ[1]N by βN , and βξ[1]l
by β• for 2 6 l 6 N − 2. Using this symmetry property in Equation SI.43, we have
β1 = N
(
1− 1
2(N − 1)
)
+ βN ; (SI.90a)
β• = − N2(N − 1) + βN ; (SI.90b)
βN = − N2(N − 1) +
1
N − 1β1 +
N − 2
N − 1β•. (SI.90c)
Combining with ∑Ni=1 pi
[1]
i β
ξ[1]
i = 0, we get β1 = − 7N−4N
2
4(N−1) , β• = − 3N4(N−1) , and βN = − N4(N−1) . The
number of variables βξ[1]ij for i 6= j is up to N(N − 1)/2. According to the symmetry of nodes
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2, · · · , N − 1, we can describe βξ[1]ij by four variables, i.e., βξ[1]1l by β1◦, βξ[1]1N by β1N , βξ[1]ls by β•◦,
and β[1]lN by β•N(ξ) for 2 6 l 6= s 6 N − 2. The second equation of Equation SI.45 can be written
as
β1◦ = − N4(N − 1) +
1
2
β•N +
1
2
β1N ; (SI.91a)
β1N = − N4(N − 1) +
N − 2
2(N − 1)β1◦ +
1
2(N − 1)β1 +
1
2
βN ; (SI.91b)
β•◦ = − N4(N − 1) + β•N ; (SI.91c)
β•N = − N4(N − 1) +
1
2(N − 1)β1◦ +
N − 3
2(N − 1)β•◦ +
1
2(N − 1)β• +
1
2
βN . (SI.91d)
Combining with β1, β•, βN , we get
β1◦ = − 11N
2 − 11N + 6
4(3N − 1)(N − 1) ; (SI.92a)
β1N = − 2N
2 − 3N + 3
2(3N − 1)(N − 1) ; (SI.92b)
β•◦ = − 15N
2 − 15N + 6
4(3N − 1)(N − 1) ; (SI.92c)
β•N = − 6N
2 − 7N + 3
2(3N − 1)(N − 1) . (SI.92d)
Using these values in θξ[L]n , we arrive at
θ
ξ[1]
1 = −
2N − 3
2(N − 1) ; (SI.93a)
θ
ξ[1]
2 = −
3(N − 2)
4(N − 1) ; (SI.93b)
θ
ξ[1]
3 = −
2N − 3
2(N − 1) . (SI.93c)
The number of variables γξ[12]ij is of order N
2. Using the symmetry property, we can describe
γ
ξ[12]
ij by nine variables, i.e. γ
ξ[12]
11 by γ11, γ
ξ[12]
1s by γ1◦, γ
ξ[12]
1N by γ1N , γ
ξ[12]
`1 by γ•1, γ
ξ[12]
`s by γ•◦,
γ
ξ[12]
`N by γ•N , γ
ξ[12]
N1 by γN1, γ
ξ[12]
Ns by γN◦, γ
ξ[12]
NN by γNN for 1 6 l, s 6 N. Then, the third equation
of Equation SI.47 can be written to be
γ11 =
N − 2
2N − 1γ1◦ +
1
2N − 1γ1N +
N − 1
2N − 1γN1 +
N − 2
(2N − 1)(N − 1)γN◦
+
1
(2N − 1)(N − 1)γNN −
N2
4(2N − 1)(N − 1)2 ; (SI.94a)
γ1◦ =
N − 1
2N − 1γ11 +
1
2N − 1γN1 +
N − 1
2N − 1γN◦ −
N2
4(2N − 1)(N − 1)2 ; (SI.94b)
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γ1N =
N − 1
2N − 1γ11 +
1
2N − 1γN1 +
N − 1
2N − 1γNN −
N2
4(2N − 1)(N − 1)2 +
N2
(2N − 1) ; (SI.94c)
γ•1 =
N − 2
2N − 1γ•◦ +
1
2N − 1γ•N +
N − 1
2N − 1γN1 +
N − 2
(2N − 1)(N − 1)γN◦
+
1
(2N − 1)(N − 1)γNN −
N2
4(2N − 1)(N − 1)2 ; (SI.94d)
γ•◦ =
N − 1
2N − 1γ•1 +
1
2N − 1γN1 +
N − 1
2N − 1γN◦ −
N2
4(2N − 1)(N − 1)2 ; (SI.94e)
γ•N =
N − 1
2N − 1γ•1 +
1
2N − 1γN1 +
N − 1
2N − 1γNN −
N2
4(2N − 1)(N − 1)2 ; (SI.94f)
γN1 =
1
2N − 1γ11 +
N − 2
(2N − 1)(N − 1)2γ1◦ +
1
(2N − 1)(N − 1)2γ1N +
N − 2
2N − 1γ•1
+
(N − 2)2
(2N − 1)(N − 1)2γ•◦ +
N − 2
(2N − 1)(N − 1)2γ•N +
N − 2
2N − 1γN◦ +
1
2N − 1γNN
− N
2
4(2N − 1)(N − 1)2 ; (SI.94g)
γN◦ =
1
(2N − 1)(N − 1)γ11 +
1
2N − 1γ1◦ +
N − 2
(2N − 1)(N − 1)γ•1
+
N − 2
2N − 1γ•◦ +
N − 1
2N − 1γN1 −
N2
4(2N − 1)(N − 1)2 ; (SI.94h)
γNN =
1
(2N − 1)(N − 1)γ11 +
1
2N − 1γ1N +
N − 2
(2N − 1)(N − 1)γ•1
+
N − 2
2N − 1γ•N +
N − 1
2N − 1γN1 −
N2
4(2N − 1)(N − 1)2 . (SI.94i)
Combining with ∑Ni=1 pi
[1]
i γ
ξ[12]
ii = 0, we obtain
γ11 =
N
σ1
(
16N5 − 82N4 + 157N3 − 142N2 + 60N − 8
)
; (SI.95a)
γ1◦ = −σ2; (SI.95b)
γ1N =
1
σ1
(
48N7 − 208N6 + 306N5 − 121N4 − 116N3 + 124N2 − 32N
)
; (SI.95c)
γ•1 = −σ3
σ1
; (SI.95d)
γ•◦ = −N
2
σ1
(
16N4 − 50N3 + 57N2 − 28N + 4
)
; (SI.95e)
γ•N = −σ2; (SI.95f)
γN1 = − 1
σ1
(
16N5 − 82N4 + 161N3 − 156N2 + 76N − 16
)
; (SI.95g)
γN◦ = − σ316(N − 1)4(6N2 − 7N + 2) ; (SI.95h)
γNN =
N
σ1
(
16N5 − 82N4 + 157N3 − 142N2 + 60N − 8
)
, (SI.95i)
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where
σ1 = 16(2N − 1)(3N − 2)(N − 1)4; (SI.96a)
σ2 =
N(15N3 − 44N2 + 44N − 16)
16(3N − 2)(N − 1)4 ; (SI.96b)
σ3 = N(16N5 − 62N4 + 99N3 − 82N2 + 36N − 8). (SI.96c)
Using these values in φξ[12]n,m , we arrive at
φ
ξ[12]
0,1 =−
N(8N5 − 52N4 + 112N3 − 107N2 + 46N − 8)
8(2N − 1)(3N − 2)(N − 1)4 ; (SI.97a)
φ
ξ[12]
2,0 =−
N2(N − 2)
2(2N − 1)(3N − 2)(N − 1)2 ; (SI.97b)
φ
ξ[12]
2,1 =−
N(8N5 − 44N4 + 84N3 − 79N2 + 38N − 8)
8(2N − 1)(3N − 2)(N − 1)4 . (SI.97c)
In layer one alone (no coupling between layer one and layer two), selection favors A replacing
B whenever
(
θ
ξ[1]
3 − θξ[1]1
)
b1 − θξ[1]2 c > 0. However, Equation SI.93 shows that θξ[1]3 − θξ[1]1 = 0
and θξ[1]2 > 0. A-individuals therefore are disfavored to replace B-individuals in a single layer for
any b1/c. The situation is exactly the same in a separate layer two.
When the two layers are coupled, inserting Equation SI.93 and Equation SI.97 into Equa-
tion SI.41, we have the condition for selection to favor A relative to B,
b1
c
>
18N4 − 55N3 + 64N2 − 33N + 6
2N2(2N − 1) . (SI.98)
Analogously, selection favors A-individuals replacing B-individuals in layer two if
b2
c
>
18N4 − 55N3 + 64N2 − 33N + 6
2N2(2N − 1) . (SI.99)
Overall, if both b1/c and b2/c exceed these thresholds, coupling the two layers can favor A re-
placing B in both layers, which could never happen without the coupling.
Next, assuming pairwise-comparison updating used in both layers, by an analogous analysis
to Equations SI.90-SI.97, we have
θ
ξ[1]
1 = −
2N − 3
(N − 1) ; (SI.100a)
θ
ξ[1]
2 = −
3(N − 2)
2(N − 1) ; (SI.100b)
φ
ξ[12]
1,0 = −
N(16N5 − 84N4 + 130N3 − 79N3 + 20N − 1)
2(N − 1)3(24N3 − 26N2 + 9N − 2) ; (SI.100c)
φ
ξ[12]
0,1 =
N2(16N4 − 52N3 + 62N2 − 29N + 5)
2(N − 1)3(24N3 − 26N2 + 9N − 1) ; (SI.100d)
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φ
ξ[12]
1,1 = −
N(8N4 − 30N3 + 34N2 − 13N + 2)
2(N − 1)3(12N2 − 7N + 1) . (SI.100e)
By substituting Equation SI.100 into Equation SI.52, we have the rule to predict the evolution of
cooperation under PC updating. Note that φξ[12]0,1 − φξ[12]1,1 > 0. Therefore, even if cooperation can
never evolve under PC updating in layer one alone for any b1/c, coupling two layers can favor
cooperation for
b2
c
> −
(
θ
ξ[1]
1 − θξ[1]2
)
b1/c + θ
ξ[1]
1 + φ
ξ[12]
1,0
φ
ξ[12]
0,1 − φξ[12]1,1
. (SI.101)
Finally, if birth-death updating is used in both layers, we can simplify Equation SI.62 to be
b1
N
∑
i,j,`=1
pi
[1]
i p
[1]
ji p
[1]
i`
(
β
ξ[1]
i` − βξ[1]j`
)
+ b2
N
∑
i,j,`=1
pi
[1]
i p
[1]
ji p
[2]
i`
(
γ
ξ[12]
i` − γξ[12]j`
)
− c
[
N
∑
i,j=1
pi
[1]
i p
[1]
ji
(
β
ξ[1]
ii − βξ[1]ji
)
+
N
∑
i,j=1
pi
[1]
i p
[1]
ji
(
γ
ξ[12]
ii − γξ[12]ji
)]
> 0
:= b1θ
ξ[1]
b + b2φ
ξ[12]
b − c
(
θ
ξ[1]
c + φ
ξ[12]
c
)
> 0.
(SI.102)
By an analysis analogous to Equations SI.90-SI.92 and SI.94-SI.95, we have
θ
ξ[1]
b = −
N(N2 − 4N + 5)
2(N2 − 2N + 2) ; (SI.103a)
θ
ξ[1]
c = −N
3 − 4N2 + 6N − 3
N2 − 2N + 2 ; (SI.103b)
φ
ξ[12]
b =
N2(N5 − 3N4 + N3 + 8N2 − 13N + 6)
(N2 − 2N + 2)2(N6 − 3N5 + 2N4 + 5N3 − 10N2 + 2N + 4) ; (SI.103c)
φ
ξ[12]
c =
N2(N − 1)2(N7 − 7N6 + 13N5 + N4 − 28N3 + 26N2 + 3N − 10)
(N2 − 2N + 2)2(2N8 − 8N7 + 9N6 + 9N5 − 32N4 + 19N3 + 14N2 − 10N − 4) . (SI.103d)
Equation SI.103 says that φξ[12]b > 0. Therefore, under BD updating, even if cooperation cannot
evolve in a separate layer one for any b1/c, coupling two layers can favor cooperation in layer
one provided
b2
c
> − θ
ξ[1]
b
φ
ξ[12]
b
b1/c + θ
ξ[1]
c + φ
ξ[12]
c . (SI.104)
SI.4 Extensions
SI.4.1 Different network sizes in different layers
In more general cases, a node appearing in one layer does not necessarily exist in the other
layer, and vice versa. Even when a node exists in both of the layers, it could be isolated or
disconnected from the majority of other individuals within the same layer, which could imply
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that this individual has negligible effects on the population dynamics. To some degree, such a
node could be considered non-existent in the corresponding layer.
Here we investigate the case where node sets in different layers overlap to some degree but
are not necessarily identical. Let V [L] denote the set of nodes in layer L and N[L] the number of
nodes accordingly. Under death-birth updating in both layers, with B[L]ij = bL p
[L]
ji and C
[L]
ij = cp
[L]
ij ,
d
dδ
∣∣∣
δ=0
ρ
[1]
A (ξ) > 0 holds if and only if(
θ
ξ[1]
1 − θξ[1]3
)
b1 +
(
φ
ξ[12]
0,1 − φξ[12]2,1
)
b2 +
(
θ
ξ[1]
2 + φ
ξ[12]
2,0
)
c > 0. (SI.105)
Here, θξ[1]n = ∑i,j∈V[1] pi
[1]
i
(
p[1]
)(n)
ij
β
ξ[1]
ij and φ
ξ[12]
n,m = ∑i∈V[1],j∈V[2] pi
[1]
i
(
p[1,2]
)(n,m)
ij
γ
ξ[12]
ij . β
ξ[1]
ij and
γ
ξ[12]
ij can be obtained by solving
β
ξ[1]
i =N
[1]
(
ξ
[1]
i − ξ̂[1]
)
+ ∑
k∈V[1]
p[1]ik β
ξ[1]
k ; (SI.106a)
β
ξ[1]
ij =
N[1]
2
(
ξ
[1]
i ξ
[1]
j − ξ̂[1]
)
+
1
2 ∑
k∈V[1]
p[1]ik β
ξ[1]
kj +
1
2 ∑
k∈V[1]
p[1]jk β
ξ[1]
ki ; (SI.106b)
γ
ξ[12]
ij =
N[1]N[2]
N[1] + N[2] − 1
[
ξ
[1]
i ξ
[2]
j − ξ̂[1]ξ̂[2]
]
+
1
N[1] + N[2] − 1 ∑k1∈V[1],k2∈V[2]
p[1]ik1 p
[2]
jk2
γ
ξ[12]
k1k2
+
N[2] − 1
N[1] + N[2] − 1 ∑k1∈V[1]
p[1]ik1γ
ξ[12]
k1 j
+
N[1] − 1
N[1] + N[2] − 1 ∑k2∈V[2]
p[2]jk2γ
ξ[12]
ik2
. (SI.106c)
and two additional constraints ∑i∈V[1] pi
[1]
i β
ξ[1]
i = 0 and ∑i∈V[1]∩V[2] pi
[1]
i γ
ξ[12]
ii = 0.
SI.4.2 An arbitrary number of layers
The number of layers may differ in multilayer systems. Here we consider a multilayer population
with an arbitrary number of layers, denoted by M. Under death-birth updating in both layers,
with B[L]ij = bL p
[L]
ji and C
[L]
ij = cp
[L]
ij ,
d
dδ
∣∣∣
δ=0
ρ
[1]
A (ξ) > 0 holds if and only if(
θ
ξ[1]
1 − θξ[1]3
)
b1 + θ
ξ[1]
2 c +
M
∑
L=2
[(
φ
ξ[1L]
0,1 − φξ[1L]2,1
)
bL + φ
ξ[1L]
2,0 c
]
> 0, (SI.107)
where φξ[1L]n,m = ∑i∈V[1],j∈V[L] pi
[1]
i
(
p[1,L]
)(n,m)
ij
γ
ξ[1L]
ij . β
ξ[1]
ij and γ
ξ[1L]
ij can be obtained by solving
β
ξ[1]
i =N
(
ξ
[1]
i − ξ̂[1]
)
+
N
∑
k=1
p[1]ik β
ξ[1]
k ; (SI.108a)
β
ξ[1]
ij =
N
2
(
ξ
[1]
i ξ
[1]
j − ξ̂[1]
)
+
1
2
N
∑
k=1
p[1]ik β
ξ[1]
kj +
1
2
N
∑
k=1
p[1]jk β
ξ[1]
ki ; (SI.108b)
γ
ξ[1L]
ij =
N2
2N − 1
[
ξ
[1]
i ξ
[L]
j − ξ̂[1]ξ̂[L]
]
+
1
2N − 1
N
∑
k1,kL=1
p[1]ik1 p
[L]
jkL
γ
ξ[1L]
k1kL
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+
N − 1
2N − 1
N
∑
k1=1
p[1]ik1γ
ξ[1L]
k1 j
+
N − 1
2N − 1
N
∑
kL=1
p[L]jkLγ
ξ[1L]
ikL
. (SI.108c)
and M additional constraints ∑Ni=1 pi
[1]
i β
ξ[1]
i = 0 and ∑
N
i=1 pi
[1]
i γ
ξ[1L]
ii = 0 for L 6= 1.
SI.5 Empirical social networks
We investigate six empirical social networks (see datasets in https://comunelab.fbk.eu/data.php).
Of these networks, some have more than two layers. Although our method can tackle with an
arbitrary number of layers, for simplicity, here we only study the evolutionary dynamics in a
two-layer network. We form a two-layer network by using only two layers of the original net-
work or sort all layers into two categories. The following are details of the six datasets:
1. CS-AARHUS (CA): the multiplex social network consists of five kinds of online and offline
relationships (Facebook, Leisure, Work, Co-authorship, Lunch) between the employees of Com-
puter Science department at Aarhus. In this work, we form a two-layer network based on online
relationship (facebook, coauthor) and offline relationship (lunch, leisure, work);
2. KAPFERER TAILOR SHOP (KTS): layers represent two different types of interaction, recorded
at two different times (seven months apart) over a period of one month. One is the “instru-
mental” (work- and assistance-related) interactions and the other is the “sociational” (friendship,
socioemotional) interactions. We form a two-layer network based on friendship over two months
and work relationship over two months;
3. KRACKHARDT HIGH TECH (KHT): the multiplex social network consists of 3 kinds of rela-
tionships (Advice, Friendship and “Reports to”) between managers of a high-tech company. We
form a two-layer network based on friendship and work relationship (“Report to”);
4. LAZEGA LAW FIRM (LLF): the multiplex social network consists of 3 kinds of relationship
(Co-work, Friendship and Advice) between partners and associates of a corporate law partner-
ship. We form a two-layer network based on friendship and work relationship (Co-work);
5. PEDGETT FLORENTINE FAMILIES (PFF): the multiplex social network consists of 2 layers
(marriage alliances and business relationships) describing florentine families in the Renaissance.
We form a two-layer network based on marriage alliances and business relationships;
6. VICKERS-CHAN-7THGRADERS MULTIPLEX NETWORK (VC7): the data were collected by
Vickers from 29 seventh grade students in a school in Victoria, Australia. Students were asked to
nominate their classmates on a number of relations including the following three (layers): Who
do you get on with in the class? Who are your best friends in the class? Who would you pre-
fer to work with? We form a two-layer network by friendship (the second question) and work
relationship (the third question).
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Table SI.1: The number of all non-isomorphic single-layer and two-layer profiles on networks of size N = 3, 4, 5, and
6
N number of non-isomorphic
single-layer profiles
number of non-isomorphic
two-layer profiles
3 3 26
4 11 1,028
5 58 114,992
6 407 36,394,472
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Table SI.2: We consider single-layer profiles of networks of size N = 6. Concretely, we randomly choose a pair of
profiles from all 407 non-isomorphic single-layer profiles (see Table SI.1). Note that the two chosen single-layer profiles
can be identical, and so there are 4072 such pairs. Let (b1/c)∗ and (b2/c)∗ respectively denote the (single-layer)
thresholds of the two profiles. (A) Frequency of choosing two single-layer profiles that one has (b1/c)∗ corresponding
to the row and the other (b2/c)∗ corresponding to the column. (B) Frequency of choosing two single-layer profiles: [1]
one has (b1/c)∗ corresponding to the row and the other (b2/c)∗ corresponding to the column; [2] with coupling the
two layers, cooperation can be favored in layer one—there exist positive values of b1/c and b2/c favoring cooperation
in layer one. (C) Frequency of choosing two single-layer profiles: [1] one has (b1/c)∗ corresponding to the row and
the other (b2/c)∗ corresponding to the column; [2] with coupling the two layers, cooperation can be favored in both
layers—there exist positive values of b1/c and b2/c favoring cooperation in both layers.
A (b2/c)∗
(−∞, 0) (0,∞) ∞
(b1/c)∗
(−∞, 0) 27.91% 24.14% 0.78%
(0,∞) 24.14% 20.89% 0.67%
∞ 0.78% 0.67% 0.02%
B (b2/c)∗
(−∞, 0) (0,∞) ∞
(b1/c)∗
(−∞, 0) 13.66% 9.58% 0.37%
(0,∞) 24.14% 20.89% 0.67%
∞ 0.30% 0.24% 0.007%
C (b2/c)∗
(−∞, 0) (0,∞) ∞
(b1/c)∗
(−∞, 0) 1.12% 9.58% 0.14%
(0,∞) 9.58% 19.99% 0.24%
∞ 0.14% 0.24% 0.003%
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Table SI.3: Analysis of cooperation on all non-isomorphic two-layer profiles of networks of N = 6. Let (b1/c)∗
and (b2/c)∗ respectively denote the critical benefit-to-cost ratio in layer one and layer two, when two layers evolve
independently. (A) Number of non-isomorphic two-layer profiles that has (b1/c)∗ corresponding to the row and
(b2/c)∗ corresponding to the column. The sum of all numbers equals the total number of non-isomorphic two-layer
profiles. (B) Number of non-isomorphic two-layer profiles: [1] has (b1/c)∗ corresponding to the row and (b2/c)∗
corresponding to the column; with coupling the two layers, cooperation can be favored in layer one—there exist
positive values of b1/c and b2/c favoring cooperation in layer one. (C) Number of non-isomorphic two-layer profiles:
[1] has (b1/c)∗ corresponding to the row and (b2/c)∗ corresponding to the column; with coupling the two layers,
cooperation can be favored in both layers—there exist positive values of b1/c and b2/c favoring cooperation in both
layers.
A (b2/c)∗
(−∞, 0) (0,∞) ∞
(b1/c)∗
(−∞, 0) 8617158 9024555 63727
(0,∞) 9024555 9468698 65751
∞ 63727 65751 550
B (b2/c)∗
(−∞, 0) (0,∞) ∞
(b1/c)∗
(−∞, 0) 4214136 3573357 30116
(0,∞) 9024555 9468698 65751
∞ 30118 26641 233
C (b2/c)∗
(−∞, 0) (0,∞) ∞
(b1/c)∗
(−∞, 0) 460047 3573357 15314
(0,∞) 3573357 9048883 26641
∞ 15314 26641 120
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Supplementary Figures
layer 1
layer 2
Supplementary Figure 1: A two-layer ring network with a given strategy configuration. The ring in each layer
has 10 nodes and the two rings are symmetrical. Blue means A-strategy and red B-strategy. In the configuration
illustrated, the distance between A-strategies in layer one and two is d = 1.
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layer 2
Supplementary Figure 2: A two-layer star network with a given strategy configuration. The star in each layer has
6 nodes. Node 6 and 1 are separately the hub in layer one and two. Blue means A-strategy and red B-strategy.
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AC
B
Supplementary Figure 3: Intuition about cooperation-promoting effects by coupling layers. We consider a two-
layer ring network of infinite size and three initial strategy configurations, as shown in panels A, B, and C. Values
next to nodes are players’ payoffs derived in corresponding layers. We study the expansion of cooperator clusters
in layer one. In layer one, cooperator cluster expands only when the defector at the boundary (dashed circle) dies
and the neighboring cooperator succeeds in dispersing its offspring to the vacant site. This happens with probability
positively related to the difference between the neighboring cooperator’s and the neighboring defector’s payoff, i.e.
uC − uD. In the absence of layer two, uC − uD = b1 − 2c. With layer two, payoffs obtained in layer two matter and
uC − uD = b1 + b2 − 4c (A), uC − uD = b1 + b2 − 2c (B), uC − uD = b1 + b2 − 4c (C). For b2 > 2c, layer two provides
more advantages to the cooperator in layer one than to the defector. The introduction of layer two thus promotes the
expansion of cooperator cluster in layer one.
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Supplementary Figure 4: Multilayer games can promote cooperation. We present an example in which cooperation
in layer one is facilitated by coupling with games in layer two. The networks consist of a “ring” in each layer, with
each node connected to two neighbors. Nodes occupying the same position of both layers represent the same player,
as illustrated by the dotted line. (A) An initial strategy configuration that contains two cooperators in layer one and
three cooperators in layer two. (B) The probability that cooperation eventually fixes in layer one, starting from the
initial configuration shown in panel A. We compare two scenarios: when the two layers evolve independently (open
squares) versus when the two layers are coupled (solid squares). Cooperation is favored by selection if it is more
likely to fix than under neutrality (δ = 0, indicated by the horizontal line). Cooperation is favored by selection when
the benefit-to-cost ratio exceeds a critical value, (b1/c)∗ (vertical line). For the benefit-to-cost ratio indicated in light
blue, coupling to layer two promotes cooperation in layer one even though it would be disfavored by selection in layer
one alone. Dots indicate results from 107 replicate Monte Carlo simulations, and lines indicate analytical predictions.
Parameters: b2 = 10, c = 1, and δ = 0.02.
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Supplementary Figure 5: Proportion of networks that permit the evolution of cooperation in both layers. We
systematically analyze all networks of N = 3, 4, 5, or 6 individuals, including all mutant configurations of a single
cooperator in each layer. Blue bars indicate the proportion of two random networks and mutant configurations,
in which selection can favor cooperation in both of them simultaneously for some b1/c > 0 and b2/c > 0 when
each of them evolve separately. Coupling the two networks increases frequency of cases in which selection can
favor cooperation in both of them simultaneously (i.e. selection favors cooperation in both layers for some choice of
b1/c > 0 and b2/c > 0, red). Given a network in layer one, coupling to a deliberately chosen network in layer two
further increases the chance that selection can favor cooperation in both layers (green).
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Supplementary Figure 6: Proportion of random and scale-free networks making cooperation favored possible
when layers evolve independently. We sampled 100 two-layer Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks of size N = 50, and 100 two-
layer scale-free networks of size N = 50, for each pair of average node degrees, k1 and k2, in layer one and layer two,
as indicated. For each two-layer network we analyzed all 2,500 initial configurations of a single mutant cooperator
in each layer. Two layers evolve separately. (A) Proportion (percentage) of sampled two-layer random networks and
configurations in which selection can favor cooperation in both layers, for some positive values of b1/c and b2/c.
(B) Proportion (percentage) of sampled two-layer scale-free networks and configurations in which selection can favor
cooperation in both layers, for some positive values of b1/c and b2/c.
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Supplementary Figure 7: Multlayer coupling increases the proportion of selection favoring cooperation in layer
one or reduces the threshold required in layer one. 100 two-layer Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks of size N = 50, and 100 two-
layer scale-free networks of size N = 50, for each pair of average node degrees, k1 and k2, in layer one and layer two,
as indicated. For each two-layer network we analyzed all 2,500 initial configurations of a single mutant cooperator
in each layer. (A) Proportion (percentage) of the sampled two-layer random networks and configurations in which
selection can favor cooperation in layer one, for some positive values of b1/c and b2/c. Highlighted entries indicate
regimes when coupling increases the frequency of selection for cooperation in layer one compared to independent
evolution in each layer. (B) Proportion (percentage) of the sampled two-layer scale-free networks and configurations
in which selection can favor cooperation in layer one, for some positive values of b1/c and b2/c. (C) Proportion
(percentage) of the sampled two-layer random networks and configurations in which coupling promotes selection
favoring cooperation in layer one: [1] for (b1/c)∗ > 0, b1/c required by selection favoring cooperation in layer one
is reduced below (b1/c)∗; [2] for (b1/c)∗ < 0, there exist positive values of (b1/c) and (b1/c) making cooperation
favored in layer one. (D) Proportion (percentage) of the sampled two-layer scale-free networks and configurations in
which coupling promotes selection favoring cooperation in layer one.
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Random networkA Scale-free networkB
Supplementary Figure 8: Examples of coupling two layers reducing the threshold in one layer and making coop-
eration favored possible in the other layer. Let (b1/c)∗ and (b2/c)∗ respectively denote the thresholds in layer one
and two when layers evolve separately. In example A, (b1/c)∗ > 0 and (b2/c)∗ < 0. Coupling two layers reduces the
value of b1/c required to favor cooperation in layer one below (b1/c)∗, and meanwhile makes cooperation favored for
some positive b1/c and b2/c. Panel B shows an example of two-layer scale-free networks.
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Supplementary Figure 9: Distribution of minimal benefit-to-cost ratios required for cooperation to be favored
in six real-world two-layer networks. We analyze all initial configurations with a mutant cooperator in each layer.
Let (b1/c)∗ denote the critical benefit-to-cost ratio required for cooperation to be favored in layer one when layers
evolve separately. The blue histogram shows the distribution of (b1/c)∗ for all initial configurations. When layers
are coupled, let (b1/c)min denote the minimum ratio required to favor cooperation in layer one, for all b2/c > 0 in
layer two. The red histogram presents the distribution of (b1/c)min for all initial configurations. Coupling layers
tends to permit cooperation to fix selectively for smaller benefit-to-cost ratio in layer one, including many cases where
cooperation is favored despite providing no immediate benefit in layer one at all, i.e. (b1/c)min = 0.
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Supplementary Figure 10: Mutants’ positions in both layers decides if coupling layers can reduce (b1/c)min to 0.
When layers are coupled, let (b1/c)min denote the minimum ratio required to favor cooperation in layer one, for all
b2/c > 0 in layer two. Assuming the mutant lies in node i in layer one and node j in layer two, mutants’ distance d
is the distance between i’s associated node and j in layer two. For example, if nodes i and j refer to the same player,
mutants’ distance is d = 0. If node j is connected to i’s associated node in layer two, mutants’ distance is d = 1. d = 2
means that node j is next nearest to i’s associated node and d > 2 means that j is at least three-step away from i’s
associated node in layer two. We analyze all initial configurations with a single mutant cooperator in each layer. For
all initial configurations with distance d, we report the proportion of the initial configuration giving (b1/c)min = 0.
The closer mutants are in layer two, the more likely coupling layers can reduce the benefit-to-cost ratio required for
cooperation to be favored in layer one to zero.
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Supplementary Figure 11: Distribution of minimal benefit-to-cost ratios required for cooperation to be favored in
two-layer random networks and two-layer scale-free networks. We investigate 100 two-layer random networks with
average degree k1 = k2 = 4 (A) and k1 = k2 = 12 (B), and 100 two-layer scale-free networks with average degree
k1 = k2 = 4 (C) and k1 = k2 = 12 (D). The size for each network is N = 50. In each two-layer network, we analyze
all initial configurations with a single mutant cooperator in each layer, which means there are 50× 50 configurations.
Let (b1/c)∗ denote the critical benefit-to-cost ratio required for cooperation to be favored in layer one when layers
evolve separately. The blue histogram shows the distribution of (b1/c)∗ for all initial configurations. When layers
are coupled, let (b1/c)min denote the minimum ratio required to favor cooperation in layer one, for all b2/c > 0 in
layer two. The red histogram presents the distribution of (b1/c)min for all initial configurations. Coupling layers
tends to permit cooperation to fix selectively for smaller benefit-to-cost ratio in layer one, including many cases where
cooperation is favored despite providing no immediate benefit in layer one at all, i.e. (b1/c)min = 0.
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Supplementary Figure 12: Mutants’ positions in both layers decides if coupling layers can reduce (b1/c)min to 0.
We investigate random networks with average degree k1 = k2 = 4 (A) and k1 = k2 = 12 (B), and scale-free networks
with average degree k1 = k2 = 4 (C) and k1 = k2 = 12 (D). Analogous to our analysis in SFig.10, the closer mutants
are in layer two, the more likely coupling layers can reduce the benefit-to-cost ratio required for cooperation to be
favored in layer one to zero.
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Supplementary Figure 13: A slight modification of one layer can promote cooperation in both layers. For a given
initial strategy configuration, coupling layers is not always conducive to cooperation in both layers. In such cases, a
slight modification of one layer, if managed properly, can make cooperation favored in both layers. In panel A, we
show a two-player population that each individual layer favors spite, i.e. (b1/c)∗ < 0 and (b2/c)∗ < 0. Coupling the
two layers does not enable the evolution of cooperation in any layer under any positive values of b1/c and b2/c (see
region λA in panel C). Severing an edge in layer two, as shown in panel B, makes cooperation evolve in both layers
possible (see region λB in panel C). In panel D, we present a two-layer population that each individual layer disfavors
cooperation replacing defection for any benefit and cost, i.e. (b1/c)∗ = ∞ and (b2/c)∗ = ∞. Coupling the two layers
still disfavor cooperation since it requires a negative value of b2/c (see region λD in panel F). Adding an edge in layer
two, as shown in panel E, makes cooperation favored in both layers (see region λE in panel F). In panels G,H, and I,
we present that a slight modification to layer two can further enhance the cooperation-promoting effects of multilayer
games. For some positive values of b1/c and b2/c, cooperation can evolve in both layers in the two-layer population
as presented in G (see region λG). Severing an edge in layer two expands the region to λH.
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Supplementary Figure 14: Proportion of networks and mutant configurations making cooperation favored possible
under pairwise-comparison updating (PC) and birth-death (BD) updating. We systematically analyzed all networks
of N = 3, 4, or 5, including all configurations of a single mutant cooperator in each layer. Blue bars indicate the
proportion of single-layer networks and mutant configurations in which selection can favor cooperation for some
benefit-to-cost ratio, i.e. (b1/c)∗ > 0. Note that under PC and BD updating, cooperation is never favored in a
single-layer population. Coupling layer one with a randomly chosen network and strategy configuration in layer two
increases the frequency of selection for cooperation (i.e. selection favors cooperation in layer one for some choice of
b1/c > 0 and b2/c > 0, red). Coupling layer one with a deliberately designed network and strategy configuration in
layer two further increases the frequency of cooperation in layer one (green).
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DSupplementary Figure 15: The independence property of coupling layers under a uniform distribution of mutants.
We investigate a two-layer circle with size N = 10. (A,B) Fixation probability of a mutant cooperator. In Panel (A),
initially, a cooperator is randomly and uniformly distributed to a node in layer one, and a cooperator is designated to
a fixed node in layer two (Fig. 3A in main text is a specific case). In panel (B), initially, two cooperators are randomly
and uniformly distributed to two nodes in layer one, and three cooperators are designated to three fixed nodes in layer
two (SFig. 4A is a specific case). When initial cooperators are uniformly distributed, in single-layer and multilayer
games, the fixation probabilities of cooperators in layer one are identical. Introducing layer two does not affect the
evolutionary dynamics in layer one at all. We take b2 = 10 and c = 1.
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Supplementary Figure 16: Investigation of two-layer networks of size up to five based on the comparison of
cooperation’s with defection’s fixation probability. We systematically analyzed all networks of N = 3, 4, or 5,
including all configurations of a single mutant in each layer. Selection is said to favor cooperation over defection
if the fixation probability of cooperator mutants exceeds the fixation probability of defector mutants. (A) Blue bars
indicate the proportion of single-layer networks and mutant configurations in which selection can favor cooperation
over defection for some benefit-to-cost ratio. Coupling layer one with a randomly chosen network and strategy
configuration in layer two increases the frequency of selection favoring cooperation over defection in layer one (red).
Coupling layer one with a deliberately designed network and strategy configuration in layer two further increases
the frequency of selection favoring cooperation in layer one (green). (B) Blue bars indicate the proportion of two
random networks and mutant configurations in which selection can favor cooperation over defection in both of them
simultaneously for some b1/c > 0 and b2/c > 0 when each of them evolves separately. Coupling the two networks
increases frequency of cases in which selection can favor cooperation in both of them simultaneously (i.e. selection
favors cooperation in both layers for some choice of b1/c > 0 and b2/c > 0, red). Given a network in layer one,
coupling to a deliberately chosen network in layer two further increases the chance that selection can favor cooperation
in both layers (green).
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